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UNITED STATES’ BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION  
OVER FOREIGN ENTITIES: EXORBITANT OR CONGRUENT? 
 
Adrian Walters* 
 
Alarmed at the ease with which global bankruptcy jurisdiction can be engineered in the 
United States through a combination of the Bankruptcy Code’s low bar to entry and the 
worldwide effects of a bankruptcy case, critics argue that the US promotes abusive 
bankruptcy forum shopping and harmful imposition of US norms on overseas 
stakeholders. This article advances a revised account of US bankruptcy jurisdiction over 
non-US debtors from a distinctively Anglo-American standpoint. The article’s central 
thesis is that critics overemphasize formal jurisdictional rules and pay insufficient 
attention to how US courts actually exercise jurisdiction in practice. It compares the 
formal law ‘on the books’ in the US and UK for determining whether or not a domestic 
insolvency or restructuring proceeding relating to a foreign debtor can be maintained in 
each jurisdiction and provides a functional account of how US bankruptcy jurisdiction 
over foreign entities is exercised in practice using the concept of jurisdictional 
congruence as a benchmark. While American and British approaches to abusive forum 
shopping are on different legal cultural paths, the article also identifies reasons for 
thinking that they are trending towards rough functional equivalence influenced, at least 
in part, by the US’s commitment to the UNCITRAL Model Law. In sum, the article lays 
foundations for further critical reflection on the roles that judges, practitioners and the 
‘centre of main interests’ principle play in configuring the market for international 
bankruptcy case filings and in facilitating and regulating forum shopping in that market. 
Through the lens of legal development, it also presents some practical and policy 
challenges for universalism, international insolvency law’s dominant theory.  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The record of the United States in recognizing foreign insolvency proceedings and giving 
effect to foreign insolvency law within its territorial jurisdiction in transnational 
insolvency cases is second to none. Bankruptcy courts routinely extend comity to foreign 
restructuring plans and, in so doing, permit foreign insolvency law to discharge or modify 
obligations under US law governed transactions.1  This practice, established before the 																																																								
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US enacted the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency2 in 2005 as chapter 
15 of the Bankruptcy Code, has accelerated since.3 US courts resist attempts by US-based 
holdout creditors to resort to US lawsuits4 or US involuntary bankruptcy proceedings5 as 
a mechanism to improve their negotiating position in foreign insolvency proceedings 
already commenced in the jurisdiction where the debtor has its centre of main interests 
(‘COMI’). And they are much more willing than their UK counterparts to permit foreign 
insolvency law to override party autonomy expressed through choice of law and venue 
clauses in contracts and financing instruments.6  
But US courts also allow forum shopping non-US entities to file full chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceedings in the US.7  And, in this respect, as far as its critics are 
concerned, the US comes unstuck. Critics are alarmed at the ease with which global 
bankruptcy jurisdiction can be engineered, through a combination of the Bankruptcy 
Code’s low bar to entry,8 and the worldwide reach of the automatic stay and the 
bankruptcy estate. Cases like Avianca9  (a successful US chapter 11 case filed by 
Colombia’s national airline) and Yukos10 (a US chapter 11 case filed by a Russian oil 
giant that restrained certain banks from participating in an expropriatory tax auction) are 
																																																																																																																																																																					
and natural persons whereas in the UK and the Commonwealth its scope is limited to 
natural persons and the law governing the insolvency of business entities is referred to as 
‘corporate insolvency law’. This article uses ‘bankruptcy’ in the wider US sense of the 
term. Any references to ‘bankruptcy’ and ‘insolvency’ are interchangeable. All uniform 
resource locators cited in footnotes were live on 16 February 2017. 
1 See A Walters, ‘Giving Effect to Foreign Restructuring Plans in Anglo-US Private 
International Law’ (2015) 3 NIBLeJ 37.  
2 UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997) with Guide to Enactment 
(2013), UN Sales No E 14 V2 (2014). 
3 See eg Canada Southern Ry Co v Gebhard (1883) 109 US 527, In re Board of Directors 
of Multicanal S.A. (2004) 314 BR 486. UK schemes of arrangement relating to non-UK 
entities have been a particular beneficiary of US largesse: see Walters (n 1). 
4 See eg JP Morgan Chase Bank v Altos Hornos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V. 412 F.3d 418 
(2nd Cir 2005) and other Second Circuit authorities discussed in In re Northshore 
Mainland Services, Inc (2015) 537 BR 192, 207. See also KA Mayr, ‘Enforcing 
Prepackaged Restructurings of Foreign Debtors Under the US Bankruptcy Code’ (2006) 
14 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 469, 504 (text to footnote 129 citing to extensive authority 
illustrating invocation by US courts of comity to dismiss lawsuits in deference to foreign 
insolvency proceedings). 
5 Multicanal (n 3). See also In re Compañia de Alimentos Fargo, SA (2007) 376 BR 427.  
6 Compare Altos Hornos (n 4) 428-429 and Fibria Celulose S/A v Pan Ocean Co Ltd 
[2014] EWHC 2124 (Ch), [2014] Bus LR 1041. 
7 See O Couwenberg & SJ Lubben, ‘Corporate Bankruptcy Tourists’ (2015) 70 Bus L 
719. 
8 ‘A dollar, a dime, or a peppercorn’ of property in the US suffices: see In re Theresa 
Mctague (1996) 198 BR 428, 431. 
9 In re Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia S.A. Avianca (2003) 303 BR 1. 
10 In re Yukos Oil Co (2005) 321 BR 396. 
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viewed as exemplars of US exorbitance.11 The consequence of such unseemliness, critics 
claim, is a ‘parade of horribles’: abusive forum shopping designed to benefit debtors at 
the expense of creditors; imposition of US law on remote stakeholders; US overreaching 
at the expense of other countries’ policy choices; costly inconvenience for foreign 
creditors forced to contest US jurisdiction; risk of contempt sanctions for foreign 
creditors who have a presence in the US; and increased risk of jurisdictional conflict. For 
the critics, undesirable aspects of American exceptionalism are at large. By asserting 
global jurisdiction in transnational insolvencies on a flimsy basis, the US encourages 
harmful forum shopping and engages in hubristic export of US norms. The normative 
implication is that the US should raise its barrier to entry making it harder for forum 
shopping foreign debtors to file under chapter 11. As Professor McCormack, a critic of 
Avianca and Yukos, puts it: ‘[i]f the jurisdictional threshold was higher, this would reduce 
the risk of inappropriate proceedings being filed.’12  
This article – which advances a revised account of US bankruptcy jurisdiction 
over non-US debtors from a distinctively Anglo-American standpoint 13  – is more 
sanguine. Its central thesis is that critics overemphasize formal jurisdictional rules and 
pay insufficient attention to how US courts actually exercise jurisdiction in practice. I 
proceed as follows. Part II sketches the emergent system for judicial coordination of 
transnational insolvencies in the US and the EU. Also discussed are the influence of 
domestic courts on bankruptcy forum shopping and the normative implications of 
universalism – international insolvency law’s dominant theory – for the exercise of 
domestic bankruptcy jurisdiction in transnational cases. Part III focuses on the influence 
of local jurisdictional rules on forum shopping. In particular, I compare the formal law 
‘on the books’ in the US and UK for determining whether or not a domestic insolvency or 
restructuring proceeding relating to a foreign debtor can be maintained in each 
jurisdiction. Part IV discusses how US bankruptcy jurisdiction over foreign entities is 
exercised in practice using the concept of jurisdictional congruence as a benchmark. Part 
IV draws on common aspects of restructuring practice, and on what I call ‘legal 
development’ cases,14 to illustrate US courts’ creativity and restraint. Under the ‘legal 
development’ rubric I revisit Avianca and consider In re Northshore Mainland Services, 
																																																								
11 G McCormack, ‘Bankruptcy Forum Shopping: The UK and US as Venues of Choice 
for Foreign Companies’ (2014) 63 ICLQ 815, 816, 822-824, 836-839, 841-842; G Affaki, 
‘A European View on the US Courts’ Approach to Cross-Border Insolvency – Lessons 
from Yukos’ in G Affaki (ed), Cross-Border Insolvency and Conflict of Jurisdictions: A 
US-EU Experience (Bruylant, 2007). 
12 McCormack (n 11) 838. 
13 The author is currently based in the US but is originally from, and spent the majority of 
his career to date in, the UK. He is a participant in, and an observer of, both legal 
systems. See further W Twining, Globalisation & Legal Theory (Butterworths 2000) 
129-133. 
14 Cases where the underdevelopment of insolvency law and/or its supporting 
institutional infrastructure in the debtor’s home country influences the debtor, often in 
conjunction with its senior creditors and other stakeholders, to shop for bankruptcy 
resolution in a mature and relatively more predictable system. 
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Inc,15 a more recent case from the District of Delaware. I argue that the way US courts 
exercise bankruptcy jurisdiction is actually more restrained than critics would have us 
believe. Part V develops a tentative argument for US-UK functional convergence in the 
regulation of forum shopping. While American and British approaches to abusive forum 
shopping are on different legal cultural paths, I identify reasons for thinking that they are 
trending towards rough functional equivalence and that US practice has plausibly evolved 
a decade on from magnets for criticism such as Avianca, Yukos and Cenargo. 16 
Moreover, the direction of travel is, I suggest, influenced at least in part, by the US’s 
commitment to the UNCITRAL Model Law, an instrument which confers global 
legitimacy on ‘main’ insolvency proceedings commenced in the country of the debtor’s 
COMI. Part VI outlines the chapter 11 case of Arcapita, a Bahraini investment bank, to 
illustrate how power and development imbalances will hold back spontaneous emergence 
of a symmetrical, universalistic, approach to international bankruptcy jurisdiction in the 
absence of a global convention. Part VII concludes. In sum, the article lays foundations 
for further critical reflection on the roles that judges, practitioners and the COMI 
principle play in configuring the market for international bankruptcy case filings and in 
facilitating and regulating forum shopping in that market. Through the lens of legal 
development, it also presents some practical and policy challenges for universalism.  
 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FOR COORDINATING TRANSNATIONAL 
INSOLVENCIES 
 
A. Legal framework 
 
International insolvencies give rise to obvious coordination difficulties. These difficulties 
are currently addressed in broadly two ways: directly, by private international law 
instruments, notably the EU Insolvency Regulation17 and the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
and, indirectly, by harmonization initiatives of varying intensity designed to foster 
convergence among national insolvency laws 18  and cooperation in transnational 
insolvency cases.19 The lack of any global insolvency treaty reflects a longstanding 																																																								
15 (2015) 537 BR 192. 
16 In re Cenargo International Plc (2003) 294 BR 571. See further McCormack (n 11) 
836.  
17 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings (recast) [2015] OJ L141/19 (‘EU 
Insolvency Regulation’) which applies to insolvency proceedings opened after 26 June 
2017. Insolvency proceedings opened before that date will continue to be governed by 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 [2000] OJ L160/1.  
18 See eg UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (Parts One and Two 2004, 
Part Three 2010, Part Four 2014)  
< http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/2004Guide.html>; 
Commission Recommendation 2014 of 12 March 2014 on a new approach to business 
failure and insolvency [2014] OJ L74/65. 
19 The American Law Institute and the International Insolvency Institute, Transnational 
Insolvency: Global Principles for Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases (ALI 
2012). 
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assumption that national insolvency laws are so infused with idiosyncratic domestic 
policy commitments that international consensus on ‘prickly’ issues, 20  such as 
distributional priorities and avoiding powers, is hard to accomplish.21 However, in the 
realm of judicial cooperation and harmonized private international law, progress in 
transnational coordination has been made. Practitioners and courts have fashioned 
solutions in cases of breathtaking complexity. The multi-jurisdictional resolution of 
causes célébres such as the Maxwell, Lehman and Nortel insolvencies would have been 
inconceivable fifty years ago.22 And so despite territorial, geopolitical and theoretical 
constraints on the feasibility of international cooperation,23 meaningful cooperation has 
happened in practice.  
Regional and international lawmaking has contributed to this steady progress. The 
EU Insolvency Regulation – now in its second iteration – takes a typical ‘double 
convention’ style of approach,24 harmonizing rules on allocation of jurisdiction to open 
insolvency proceedings, applicable law and recognition of insolvency proceedings and 
insolvency-related judgments throughout the EU. The UNCITRAL Model Law  – has 
been enacted by forty-one countries across the globe.25 Compared to the EU Insolvency 
Regulation, the Model Law is a weaker, less comprehensive, ‘private international law 
light’26 instrument that, by design, steers clear of a prescriptive approach to choice of law 
issues, pursuing instead a pragmatic, incremental strategy aimed at building international 
consensus around a series of norms that are primarily procedural in character.27  
																																																								
20 J Pottow, ‘Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy’ (2005) 
45 Va J Int’l L 935, 941. See also S Block-Lieb & T Halliday, ‘Incrementalisms in 
Global Lawmaking’ (2007) 32 Brook J Int’l Law 851, 855-856. 
21 For historical insight, see S Block-Lieb, ‘Turnaround: Reflections on the Present Day 
Influence of Negotiations on International Bankruptcy at the Fifth Session of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law in 1925’ (2014) 9 Brook J Corp Fin & Com L 1. 
22 See eg J Westbrook, ‘The Lessons of Maxwell Communication’ (1996) 64 Fordham LR 
2531; J Altman, ‘A Test Case in International Bankruptcy Protocols: The Lehman 
Brothers Insolvency’ (2011) 12 San Diego Int’l LJ 463; LL Peacock, ‘A Tale of Two 
Courts: The Novel Cross-Border Bankruptcy Trial’ (2015) 23 Am Bankr Inst L Rev 543. 
23 F Tung, ‘Is International Bankruptcy Possible?’ (2001) 23 Mich J Int’l L 31. 
24 S Block-Lieb & T Halliday, ‘Less is More in International Private Law’  (2015) 3 
NIBLeJ 4, [24]. The EU Regulation’s original text was derived from an earlier, lapsed 
Bankruptcy Convention that was itself a product of around thirty years’ of ‘on-off’ 
negotiations: see M Balz, ‘The European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings’ (1996) 
70 Am Bankr LJ 485. 
25 Including all the NAFTA countries (Canada, Mexico, the US), the leading countries of 
the Asia-Pacific Rim (Australia, Japan, New Zealand), the OHADA countries and the 
UK. For the current list of adopting countries see 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html>. 
26 Block-Lieb & Halliday (n 24), [26]. 
27 See further Pottow (n 20); Block-Lieb & Halliday (n 20); J Clift, ‘Choice of Law and 
the UNCITRAL Harmonization Process’ (2014) 9 Brook J Corp Fin & Com L 20. For 
comparison of the Model Law and the EU Insolvency Regulation see also I Mevorach, 
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Both instruments contemplate that an international insolvency case will comprise 
a single proceeding taking place in the state where the debtor’s COMI is located or a 
series of concurrent proceedings taking place in more than one state with which the 
debtor is substantially connected. 28  Both instruments accord primacy to a ‘main’ 
insolvency proceeding conducted in the state of the debtor’s COMI and reflect, with 
varying degrees of potency, the universalist ideal of ‘a unitary bankruptcy proceeding in a 
bankrupt’s ‘home’ country, which applies universally to all the bankrupt’s assets and 
which receives worldwide recognition.’29  In this ‘single main proceeding’ mode, foreign 
representatives of insolvent estates expect to have their authority to act under COMI law 
recognized with minimal procedural formality in other countries where there are assets 
and creditors30 and to enjoy access to, and cooperation from, the courts of those other 
countries in administering the estate’s affairs, whether in pursuit of an orderly winding-
up or a coordinated rescue strategy.31  
The alternative ‘concurrent proceeding’ mode acknowledges the reality that in a 
world of divergent interests in which territorially based jurisdiction persists, and assets 
and creditors are situated in many locations, two or more countries may conceivably 
assert jurisdiction in relation to the same debtor entity. While the EU Insolvency 
Regulation and the Model Law handle this mode differently, both instruments seek to 
avoid jurisdictional conflicts by espousing open-ended norms of international 
cooperation, designed to encourage courts and estate representatives in concurrent 																																																																																																																																																																					
‘On the Road to Universalism: A Comparative and Empirical Study of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency’ (2011) 12(4) EBOR 517, 522-528. 
28 See further Transnational Insolvency: Global Principles (n 19) 34. 
29 G McCormack, ‘Universalism in Insolvency Proceedings and the Common Law’ 
(2012) 32 OJLS 325. See further EU Insolvency Regulation, recitals (23), (24), (48), arts 
3, 7, 19-21, 33 (delineating scope and effects of ‘main’ and ‘secondary’ proceedings); 
UNCITRAL Model Law, arts 2, 15-17, 20-22 (providing for recognition of ‘foreign 
main’ and ‘foreign non-main’ insolvency proceedings and delineating the relief available 
in each type of proceeding). Space does not permit a full exposition of the COMI 
concept. For instructive case law see Case C-341/04 In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] Ch 
508; Case C-396/09 Interedil Srl (in liquidation) v Fallimento Interedil Srl [2012] Bus 
LR 1582. Secondary or non-main proceedings also qualify for international recognition 
where the debtor has an establishment in the country in which the proceedings are 
opened. The concept of establishment across the two instruments is virtually identical. It 
denotes some kind of meaningful economic presence: EU Insolvency Regulation, art 
2(10); UNCITRAL Model Law, art 2(f). 
30 EU Insolvency Regulation, recital 65, arts 19-21 (providing for recognition and effects 
of insolvency proceedings and pan-EU powers of insolvency practitioner); UNCITRAL 
Model Law, arts 15-17 (setting out the rules governing an application for recognition by a 
foreign representative).  
31EU Insolvency Regulation, art 21 (conferring powers on ‘main’ proceeding insolvency 
practitioner to act in other member states), art 32 (providing for recognition and 
enforcement of insolvency-related judgments); UNCITRAL Model Law, arts 7, 9-12, 19-
23 (providing foreign representatives with access rights and various forms of relief 
pending and following recognition of a foreign insolvency proceeding). 
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proceedings to communicate and cooperate with the aim of facilitating coordinated 
solutions and procedural efficiencies, but without undermining the jurisdictional integrity 
of the courts involved.32 These norms are grounded in practitioner innovations, such as 
court-approved protocols, and developments in inter-court communication.33  
Thus, even without an international insolvency treaty, foreign representatives may 
typically now perform many basic operations abroad, such as protecting overseas assets 
from enforcement through a local stay, releasing local attachments, and coordinating 
management of claims and distributions with local courts or bankruptcy trustees, with 
relative ease. Although the threshold jurisdictional criteria (COMI or establishment) 
disfavour ‘letterbox’ entities incorporated in offshore tax havens, 34  the empirical 
evidence to date confirms that the Model Law has been effective in facilitating 
streamlined recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings.35 
 
B. Domestic courts, global governance and forum shopping 
 
In a system where instruments of private international law provide the framework for 
coordination of transnational commercial activity, domestic courts play a frontline role in 
global governance.36 In the transnational insolvency context, domestic courts allocate 
governance authority by deferring, or not deferring, to the primacy of foreign main 
insolvency proceedings as regards assets and claimants within their territorial 
jurisdiction. Binary decisions by courts to assume bankruptcy jurisdiction over a person 
or entity rather than defer to a foreign court on forum non conveniens grounds, or to grant 
rather than deny recognition to a foreign insolvency proceeding, or to apply local priority 
rather than foreign priority rules to the distribution of local assets, or to domesticate 
rather than refuse to domesticate a foreign bankruptcy court judgment, all affect how 
governance authority is allocated and exercised among states.37 How these decisions play 
out in domestic courts around the world over time in turn affects the strategic decision-																																																								
32 EU Insolvency Regulation, recitals (48)-(50), arts 41-43; UNICTRAL Model Law, arts 
25-30 (providing for cooperation and communication between courts and across various 
other dimensions). See further Transnational Insolvency: Global Principles (n 19) 
Sections I & II. Some progress has also been made as regards coordination of insolvency 
proceedings involving corporate groups: EU Insolvency Regulation, ch V; UNCITRAL, 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (Part Three 2010).  
33 Transnational Insolvency: Global Principles (n 19) Sections I & II. The legislative 
preference is for the proceeding in the COMI country to be predominant and any 
concurrent proceeding to be circumscribed accordingly. 
34 A Dawson, ‘Offshore Bankruptcies’ (2009) 88 Neb L Rev 317. 
35 Mevorach (n 27); J Leong, ‘Is Chapter 15 Universalist or Territorialist? Empirical 
Evidence from United States Bankruptcy Cases’ (2011) 29 Wis Int’l LJ 110; JL 
Westbrook, ‘An Empirical Study of the Implementation in the United States of the Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (2013) 87 Am Bankr LJ 247. 
36	See generally R Michaels, ‘Global Problems in Domestic Courts’ in Muller et al (eds), 
The Law of the Future and the Future of the Law (TOAEP 2011) 165, 173-174.	
37 See generally C Whytock, ‘Domestic Courts and Global Governance’ (2009) 84 Tul L 
Rev 67. 
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making of transnational actors, especially debtors, senior creditors, and their professional 
advisers.  
If we conceive of forum shopping for bankruptcy resolution in crude market 
terms, the legal environment consisting of rules, standards and institutions shapes the 
‘supply’ side while capital structures, power dynamics and dimensions of control among 
key stakeholders shape the ‘demand’ side.  Consistent application of legal standards by 
courts creates predictability on the ‘supply’ side. ‘Demand’ side decisions depend on 
interactions among those stakeholders who have functional control of the debtor entity’s 
decision making – often, senior creditors38 – and the professional advisers who act as 
case placers. Thus, there is a ‘feedback loop’ between domestic court decisions that 
allocate governance authority in transnational cases and subsequent decisions by debtors 
and case placers to select a particular venue for insolvency proceedings.39  Of course, 
forum shopping decisions are also influenced by substantive considerations. Shoppers 
will prefer the bankruptcy system with the legal and procedural dispensation most likely 
to deliver the substantive outcomes they desire in real time in predictable and timely 
fashion. Nevertheless, if the domestic court in the preferred venue is unlikely to assert 
bankruptcy jurisdiction in a transnational case or will struggle to have its jurisdiction 
recognized in other countries, any substantive advantages of that venue’s bankruptcy 
system may be illusory.  
The growth in the market for UK Companies Act schemes of arrangement in 
relation to non-UK companies illustrates how domestic court decisions in more than one 
country combine to configure forum shopping choices. UK courts consistently approve 
schemes of arrangement proposed by foreign companies, taking jurisdiction on the basis 
of a ‘sufficient connection’ with the UK.40 Schemes have attracted a favourable market 
perception among foreign entities and case placers because they are not strictly 
insolvency proceedings and are accessible without proof of insolvency. The apparent 																																																								
38 There is now an extensive literature on the role of lenders in the governance of 
bankruptcies and its impact on outcomes. See eg JL Westbrook, ‘The Control of Wealth 
in Bankruptcy’ (2004) 82 Tex LR 795; J Armour et al, ‘The Costs and Benefits of 
Secured Creditor Control in Bankruptcy: Evidence from the UK’ (2012) 8 Review of 
Law & Econ 101. Space does not permit elaboration of the point but there is a tendency 
in bankruptcy forum shopping literature to assume that debtors are relatively 
unconstrained in the choices they make. The assumption prompts the worry that debtors 
will choose pro-debtor bankruptcy law and impose it to the disadvantage of 
uncoordinated, widely dispersed creditors and equity interests. The idea that distressed 
transnational corporate debtors can freely shop is a myth that pays scant attention to 
capital structures in the real world and the power dynamics that they generate. In a world 
where capital structures are highly leveraged, lenders call the shots, not debtors and 
managers. See, relatedly, A Schwarz, ‘Bankruptcy Related Contracting and Bankruptcy 
Functions’ available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2806027>.  
39 See Whytock (n 37) 96-114 characterizing domestic court decisions that affect the 
behaviour of transnational actors as the ‘transnational shadow of the law.’ The role of 
feedback loops, drawn from complexity theory, is developed below in Part V.  
40 See Walters (n 1). On ‘sufficient connection’ as a jurisdictional hook see further Part 
III below. 
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willingness of courts in other European countries to give effect to UK schemes based on 
connections such as English choice of law and jurisdiction clauses in the debtor’s 
financing instruments has helped consolidate the UK’s position as the EU’s premier 
venue for financial restructuring.41  UK schemes are also used to restructure New York 
law governed bonds in the high yield market. In these restructurings, it is established 
practice for non-UK debtors to deploy a range of techniques, including migrating their 
COMIs by moving headquarters to the UK before proposing a scheme. As well as 
satisfying the UK’s threshold jurisdictional requirement of a ‘sufficient connection’, a 
COMI migration makes the scheme exportable to the US as a foreign main proceeding 
through the portal of chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.  US courts routinely recognize 
and give binding effect to such schemes in the US and, in so doing, underwrite the 
efficacy of UK schemes.42 The pattern of US acquiescence enhances the predictability 
and appeal of this species of forum shopping to debtors and case placers.   
 
C. Universalism and domestic bankruptcy jurisdiction: the ‘ideal’ and the ‘real’ 
 
Universalists regard instruments like the UNCITRAL Model Law as a staging post on the 
journey towards ultimate realization of their ‘ideal’ – a single primary bankruptcy 
proceeding in the debtor’s home country, with courts elsewhere assisting the ‘home’ 
(COMI) court to achieve unitary administration of assets under ‘home’ (COMI) 
bankruptcy law.43 They seek to globalize the welfare benefits of domestic bankruptcy law 
systems, namely: (i) aggregate value maximization achieved through collective 
proceedings that prevent a run on the debtor’s assets and (ii) equivalent treatment of 																																																								
41 J Payne, ‘Cross-Border Schemes of Arrangement and Forum Shopping’ (2013) 13(4) 
EBOR 563. The scheme of arrangement is outside the scope of the EU Insolvency 
Regulation with the consequence that the Regulation’s venue and recognition rules, 
predicated on the debtor having its COMI or an establishment in the country where 
insolvency proceedings are opened, do not apply. The willingness of EU member states 
to accept the effect of English schemes is influenced by other aspects of the EU acquis, 
notably Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6 
and Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters (the Recast Brussels Regulation) [2012] OJ L351/1. The UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU following the electorate’s vote for ‘Brexit’ in the referendum on 
23 June 2016 will radically affect the legal environment unless the UK and EU agree to 
alternative arrangements for mutual recognition in this area of private international law 
whether on a transitional or a permanent basis. 
42 Walters (n 1). For recent examples see In re Magyar Telecom BV [2013] EWHC 3800 
(Ch), [2014] BCC 448; In re Zlomrex International Finance SA [2013] EWHC 3866 
(Ch); In re DTEK Finance BV [2015] EWHC 1164 (Ch); In re Codere Finance (UK) Ltd 
[2015] EWHC 3778 (Ch). It is important to add the qualifier that the grant of recognition 
and relief to these schemes in the US has invariably been unopposed. 
43 JL Westbrook, ‘National Regulation of Multinational Default’ in M Monti et al (eds), 
Economic Law and Justice in Times of Globalisation (Nomos 2007) 777, 778-779.	
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similarly situated creditors, under a single law and a single, collective claims resolution 
process.44 The goal is to move as far, and as quickly as possible, from territorialism – an 
uncoordinated state-centric ‘system’ in which each jurisdiction ‘grabs’ and administers 
locally situated assets under local law in piecemeal fashion for the benefit of locally 
situated creditors. Universalists contend that territorialism reproduces in the international 
context all of the welfare problems that bankruptcy laws are designed to address 
domestically: costly, duplicative claims enforcement; destruction of going concern value; 
asymmetric distributional outcomes favouring some creditors over others; and high costs 
of lending ex ante because of the lack of a coordinated, predictable exit for lenders in the 
event of default.45 Territorialists worry about the imposition of the debtor’s home 
bankruptcy law on remote stakeholders and the implications of universalism for state 
sovereignty, especially the implications for local priority rules infused with local policy 
choices.46 They are sovereigntists who prefer cooperation among sovereigns to the global 
hegemony of a single law. While the debate has been influential, my purpose is not to 
engage with it here. But I do need to consider briefly the normative implications of 
universalism for the allocation of governance authority in transnational cases by domestic 
courts.   
 Universalism and territorialism are bookends – opposite extremes on a spectrum 
neither of which adequately captures the way the international bankruptcy system 
functions. Universalists concede that ‘the ideal remains some distance away’47 and 
characterize the present state of affairs as ‘modified universalism’, a transitional ‘system’ 
which tries to approximate, through international cooperation, the outcomes of a pure 
universalist system, while accommodating protections for local creditors and sovereign 
																																																								
44 The article assumes that readers are generally familiar with the debate between 
universalists and territorialists regarding the most suitable model for resolving 
transnational insolvencies. The universalist position is staked out in JL Westbrook, 
‘Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum’ 
(1991) 65 Am Bankr LJ 457; ‘A Global Solution to Multinational Default (2000) 98 
Mich LR 2276. As much of the literature is American, it is no great surprise that 
universalism in its pure, platonic form looks much like a global projection of US federal 
bankruptcy law, which is a single, ‘meta’ law that stays and resolves claims arising 
throughout the US under the laws of multiple sovereign states.  
45 Westbrook (n 43). 
46 LM Lopucki, ‘The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy’ 
(2000) 98 Mich LR 2216; JJ Chung, ‘The New Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code: A 
Step Towards Erosion of National Sovereignty’ (2006) 27 NW J Int’l L & Bus 89. See 
also SM Franken, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency Law: A Comparative Institutional Analysis’ 
(2014) 34 OJLS 97, 98 (‘The fundamental difference between territorialism and 
universalism is that in the case of territorialism, states are guaranteed of the application of 
their own insolvency law to assets located in their jurisdiction, whereas in the case of 
universalism, states need to accept that foreign law may apply to assets located in their 
jurisdiction’). 
47 Westbrook (n 43) 779. 
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state interests.48 Despite the concession, for universalists, what matters is the journey 
towards their desired end goal – a single, global insolvency proceeding conducted in the 
jurisdiction of the debtor’s COMI in accordance with COMI law. So the questions that 
interest them are questions about how we can best progress from the ‘transitional’ to the 
‘ideal’, be that through low level procedural harmonization designed to prepare the 
ground for more intensive cooperation,49 international choice of law rules,50 a global 
interpretive sensibility in judicial handling of Model Law-based domestic enactments,51 
or other mechanisms.  
 In the universalists’ ideal world, the debtor’s COMI would serve as a uniform, 
global jurisdictional and choice of law rule and other countries where there are assets or 
claims needing to be administered would fall into line and adopt an ancillary posture 
without opening local insolvency proceedings. Universalism would therefore mimic a 
global double convention with the debtor’s COMI determining jurisdiction, choice of law 
and recognition of the ‘home’ insolvency proceeding elsewhere. Under conditions of pure 
universalism, local rules of bankruptcy jurisdiction applicable in domestic cases would be 
overridden in transnational cases and courts would allocate governance authority 
accordingly. There is a lively debate about whether or not universalism would lead to 
rampant bankruptcy forum shopping with views differing on the predictability and 
manipulability of the COMI test.52 Experience in Europe, including the experience 
relating to UK schemes of arrangements described earlier, suggests that debtors can 
easily manipulate COMI for bankruptcy forum shopping purposes.53 But the degree to 
which COMI can be manipulated is not my present concern. COMI is the jurisdictional 
grundnorm underlying the entire universalist system and, for universalists, the debtor’s 
COMI should determine how governance authority is allocated in transnational cases as a 
normative matter. 
In the real world, under conditions of modified universalism, domestic rules of 
bankruptcy jurisdiction remain salient and affect forum shopping. The EU Insolvency 																																																								
48 See eg E Adams & J Fincke, ‘Coordinating Cross-Border Bankruptcy: How 
Territorialism Saves Universalism’ (2009) 15 Colum J Eur L 43; J Pottow, ‘Beyond 
Carve-Outs and Toward Reliance: A Normative Framework for Cross-Border Insolvency 
Choice of Law’ (2014) 9 Brook J Corp Fin & Com L 202. The Model Law is generally 
characterized as an instrument of modified universalism. See eg JL Westbrook, ‘Chapter 
15 at Last’ (2005) 79 Am Bankr LJ 713, 719; Mevorach (n 27) 520.  
49 Pottow (n 20).  
50 Pottow (n 48). 
51 JL Westbrook, ‘Interpretation Internationale’ (2015) 87 Temp L Rev 739. 
52 LM Lopucki, ‘Global and Out of Control?’ (2005) 79 Am Bankr LJ 79; S Bufford, 
‘Global Venue Controls Are Coming: A Reply to Professor Lopucki’ (2005) 79 Am 
Bankr LJ 105; LM Lopucki, ‘Universalism Unravels’ (2005) 79 Am Bankr LJ 143; J 
Pottow, ‘The Myth (and Realities) of Forum Shopping in Transnational Insolvency’ 
(2007) 32 Brook J Int’l Law 785. 
53 In the European context see eg Case C-396/09 Interedil Srl (in liquidation) v 
Fallimento Interedil Srl [2012] Bus LR 1582. Art 3(1) of the EU Insolvency Regulation 
now places a modest limit on the ability of debtors to move their registered offices to 
another Member State within three months of a bankruptcy filing. 
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Regulation has moved closer to the universalist ideal than the Model Law by 
harmonizing rules of bankruptcy jurisdiction, applicable law and recognition. However, 
in cases outside the EU, or cases having an extra-European dimension, jurisdictional rules 
are not harmonized. Thus, debtors have opportunities to forum shop in powerful countries 
like the US that have low barriers to entry, falling short of the COMI threshold, coupled 
with long-arm jurisdiction. In the real world, the questions for debtors, stakeholders and 
case placers are: (i) can we achieve our goals through an insolvency proceeding in this 
particular jurisdiction compared to other jurisdictions; and (ii) to the extent we need to 
export the effects of the proceeding to other countries, are we confident that other 
countries will cooperate? Thus, we can expect forum shopping to persist insofar as there 
are legal or procedural advantages to be gained from it even in the face of harmonization 
initiatives of various kinds.54 
Universalists acknowledge these realities but prefer domestic courts to exercise 
bankruptcy jurisdiction commensurate with the Model Law’s rules for recognition of 
foreign main and foreign non-main proceedings. If courts acted according to this 
universalist preference, it would produce a rough symmetry. Courts would only ever 
assert bankruptcy jurisdiction over foreign entities on the same criteria, and to the same 
extent, that they would recognize foreign insolvency proceedings relating to those 
entities: worldwide jurisdiction based on COMI or more limited territorial jurisdiction 
based on the presence of an establishment. Courts would carefully circumscribe their 
jurisdiction where the debtor has only an establishment or assets within their territory or 
decline jurisdiction altogether in favour of the COMI court.55 As practical experience of 
modified universalism in the real world is spread through instruments such as the Model 
Law, it is conceivable that countries with a history of long-arm bankruptcy jurisdiction 
may act increasingly with restraint.56  
 
III. BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN ENTITIES IN THE US AND 
THE UK: THE LAW ‘ON THE BOOKS’ 
 
This Part compares how bankruptcy jurisdiction over foreign entities is formally 
configured in the US and UK. The formal account lays the foundation for the switch to 
functional considerations in Parts IV and V. I use the UK as a comparator partly for 
pragmatic reasons (it is the system with which I am most familiar), partly because the UK 
approach has been influential throughout the British common law world, further 
underscoring the distinctiveness of the US approach. My discussion of UK jurisdiction 
																																																								
54 See, e.g., F Mucciarelli, ‘The Unavoidable Persistence of Forum Shopping in European 
Insolvency Law’ <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2375654>.   
Indeed, without incredibly restrictive rules on COMI shifting, forum shopping would 
persist even if insolvency law were globally uniform, as shoppers would still shop among 
different procedural dispensations, different local legal cultures, and/or different 
interpretations of uniform law. The effect of circuit court splits and local legal culture on 
the administration of domestic bankruptcy law in the US illustrates the point graphically.  
55 Westbrook (n 43) 786-790. 
56 See further Westbrook (n 43). 
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focuses on the UK’s residual winding-up and restructuring jurisdiction applicable in 
cases falling outside the scope of the EU Insolvency Regulation.57  
Both countries formally assert bankruptcy jurisdiction over foreign entities on a 
more liberal basis than on which they are prepared to recognize other countries’ 
assertions of bankruptcy jurisdiction within their own borders.58 And both inevitably use 
territorial connecting factors as predicates for bankruptcy jurisdiction. However, the 
formal mix of substantive and procedural rules that facilitate and constrain the exercise of 
jurisdiction are differently constituted in ways that reflect diversity in the two countries’ 
legal and bankruptcy cultures and approaches to the extraterritorial projection of power.  
 
A. US jurisdiction 
 
Two claims that critics make about the US’s formal rules of bankruptcy jurisdiction 
cannot be doubted. First, the US does have a low formal barrier of entry to bankruptcy 
proceedings. Second, the US does make expansive claims about the theoretical reach of 
its bankruptcy law as regards any corporate debtor, domestic or foreign, that files a US 
case. 
Three provisions of the Bankruptcy Code control entry to the bankruptcy system: 
sections 109, 301 and 303. These provisions apply to domestic and foreign incorporated 
entities and to liquidation and reorganization bankruptcies.  Simply put, domestic and 
foreign debtors are treated the same under the Bankruptcy Code. If the requirements are 
satisfied, a bankruptcy case under chapter 7 or 11 is lawfully commenced.  
Section 109 provides that ‘…only a person that resides or has a domicile, a place 
of business, or property in the United States…may be a debtor under this title.’ The term 
‘person’ is broadly defined to include ‘an individual, partnership, and corporation.’59 The 
remainder of the statutory language is disjunctive. A person is an eligible debtor if that 
person can satisfy any one of the eligibility requirements.  ‘Property’ in the US therefore 
suffices for eligibility. Moreover, courts have settled that the plain meaning of ‘property’ 
is any amount of property, how ever small the quantity, and have declined to read into the 
statute a ‘material’ or ‘minimum’ property eligibility threshold. A foreign entity therefore 
qualifies as a debtor under section 109 if, on the date of the petition,60 it has only nominal 
amounts of US property: cash in a US bank account;61 an unearned portion of an 
attorney’s retainer;62 shares in a US corporation;63 original books and records.64 Section 
																																																								
57 Which applies, notwithstanding the UK electorate’s vote for ‘Brexit’ in the referendum 
on 23 June 2016, until such time as the UK formally withdraws from the EU.	
58 See Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236 [46], [126] (Lord 
Collins) as regards the UK and McCormack (n 11) 839, 841-2 as regards the US. 
59 11 USC §101(41) (2012). 
60 In re Axona International Credit & Commerce, Ltd 88 BR 597 614-15 (1988). 
61 In re Theresa Mctague (1996) 198 BR 428 ($194 in bank account); In re Iglesias 
(1998) 226 BR 721 ($522 in bank account); In re Globo Comunicacoes E Participacoes 
SA (Globopar) (2004) 317 BR 235 ($32,000 in bank account). 
62 In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd (2000) 251 BR 31 ($400,000 retainers held in escrow 
by debtors’ US attorney). 
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301 provides that an eligible debtor can commence a voluntary bankruptcy case under 
any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code by filing a petition with the bankruptcy court. In 
prescribed circumstances, creditors may also initiate a chapter 7 or 11 case in respect of 
an eligible debtor under section 30365 but US courts routinely dismiss involuntary 
proceedings commenced by creditors against foreign debtors.66 Federal district courts 
have ‘original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.’67 Bankruptcy courts 
within each federal district exercise this jurisdiction by referral from the district court.68 
Thus, if a case is properly commenced by, or in relation to, an eligible debtor under 
sections 301 or 303, in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, 69 federal 
bankruptcy jurisdiction arises.70  
By fostering swift and unconstrained access and eschewing barriers to entry that 
are common in many other countries, such as ‘insolvency’ eligibility requirements, the 
US system is highly conducive to bankruptcy forum shopping. The legal framework 
reflects US bankruptcy culture’s deep normative commitment to the idea that debtors 																																																																																																																																																																					
63 Globopar (n 61) (Brazilian parent holding shares in wholly-owned Delaware 
subsidiary). 
64 In re Paper I Partners LP (2002) 283 BR 661 (books and records of limited 
partnerships held by US-based general partner). 
65 Although US law is not nearly as well disposed to hostile creditor-initiated 
bankruptcies as UK law: see J Kilborn & A Walters, ‘Involuntary Bankruptcy as Debt 
Collection: Multi-Jurisdictional Lessons in Choosing the Right Tool for the Job’ (2013) 
87 Am Bankr LJ 123.  
66 In re Board of Directors of Multicanal S.A. (2004) 314 BR 486; In re Compañia de 
Alimentos Fargo, SA (2007) 376 BR 427; Globopar (n 61) 255-56. In the Suntech case, 
the hostility of US courts to involuntary filings prompted a settlement between the debtor 
and holdout bondholders that resulted in a Cayman bankruptcy filing assisted by a US 
chapter 15 case rather than an involuntary US chapter 11 case: see GW Shuster, Jr & BW 
Loveland, ‘Will Chapter 15 be the “Exclusive Destination” for Foreign Debtors’ (2015) 
34 Am Bankr Inst J 42-43, 90; A Tang & C Lam, Wuxi Suntech Power Co., Ltd: The 
First PRC Reorganisation Involving Shareholders Subject to Foreign Proceedings 
(INSOL International Case Study No. 7, May 2016). 
67 28 USC §1334(a). 
68 28 USC §157(a), (d). Strictly, therefore, bankruptcy courts exercise the jurisdiction of 
federal district courts. The referral, or ‘reference’ process, as it is better known, is a 
mechanism designed to overcome a constitutional separation of powers problem: see 
Stern v Marshall (2011) 131 S Ct 2594. 
69 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure rr 1002-1021. 
70 This jurisdiction is both in rem insofar as it relates to the administration of property and 
in personam insofar as it relates to the debtor and creditors: see Globopar (n 61) 252-54; 
cf Westbrook (n 43) 783-84. The idea of bankruptcy as a collective, federal in rem 
proceeding is embedded and goes some way towards explaining why a federal 
bankruptcy proceeding is predicated on the debtor having property within US territorial 
jurisdiction. See further R Brubaker, ‘One Hundred Years of Federal Bankruptcy Law 
and Still Clinging to an In Rem Model of Bankruptcy Jurisdiction’ (1999) 15 Bankr Dev 
J 261; Tennesee Student Assistance Corporation v Hood (2004) 541 US 440. 
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should presumptively have a fair chance to reorganize without unnecessary, potentially 
value-destructive, delay.71 Early filing is encouraged; litigation over access at the outset 
of a case is discouraged.72 Premature testing of the rationale of the bankruptcy filing or, 
in a chapter 11 case, of the likelihood of successful reorganization, is discouraged. There 
is no formal hearing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition. The commencement of a 
voluntary case in and of itself constitutes the grant of an order for relief.73 Thus, issues 
such as abuse of process or forum non conveniens are not addressed as a matter of course 
before a case formally commences. The US prefers not to strangle cases at birth. But one 
consequence of liberal eligibility requirements is that foreign debtors, in theory, can 
engineer US bankruptcy cases by moving property into the US – for example, depositing 
dollars in a US bank account – on the eve of a bankruptcy filing.  
 Commencement of a US case creates a worldwide bankruptcy estate comprised of 
all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property ‘wherever located’ and the 
debtor can be ordered to turn property over to the estate.74 Accordingly, US courts claim 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the debtor’s worldwide property.75 Commencement of a 
US case also automatically stays individual enforcement action of various kinds against 
estate property.76 As the estate encompasses the debtor’s worldwide property, the stay 
restrains creditors who are subject to US personal jurisdiction from taking enforcement 
action against the debtor’s property anywhere in the world without the permission of the 
US court77 on threat of being held in contempt.78 And as US rules of personal jurisdiction 
based on ‘minimum contacts’ are liberal,79 the scope of the stay is potentially far 																																																								
71 JL Westbrook et al, A Global View of Business Insolvency Systems (The World Bank 
2010) 66. 
72 Ibid. See further In re SGL Carbon Corporation 200 F 3d 154 (3rd Cir 1999).  
73 11 USC §301(b). 
74 11 USC §541(a)(1); In re Rajapakse  (2005) 346 B.R. 346. 
75 28 USC §1334(e). The extraterritorial reach of US statutes has been contested in the 
US in a range of regulatory contexts and, of late, the US Supreme Court has rigorously 
applied the presumption against extraterritoriality, signalling a willingness to constrain, 
rather than expand, the exercise of US power: see eg Morrison v National Australia Bank 
(2010) 561 US 247; Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co (2014) 133 S Ct 1659. In the 
bankruptcy context, there is disagreement concerning the reach of bankruptcy avoiding 
powers: compare SIPC v Bernard L Madoff Investment Securities (2014) 513 BR 222 and 
In re Lyondell Chemical Co (2016) 543 BR 417. See further discussion in ER Morrison, 
‘Extraterritorial Avoidance Actions: Lessons from Madoff’ (2014) 9 Brooklyn J Corp Fin 
& Com L 268. 
76 11 USC §362(a). 
77 11 USC §362(d). 
78 11 USC §362(k). 
79 International Shoe v Washington (1945) 326 US 310. As is the case with 
extraterritoriality (n 75), however, the recent US Supreme Court jurisprudence 
concerning personal jurisdiction over foreign parties is trending towards restraint: see 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v Brown (2011) 564 US 915; J McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd v Nicastro (2013) 564 US 873; Daimler AG v Bauman (2014) 134 SCt 
746; PJ Borchers, ‘The Twilight of the Minimum Contacts Test’ (2014) 11 Seton Hall Cir 
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reaching. Foreign parties who maintain a US presence or who hold US assets that could 
be targeted for enforcement purposes are wise to be concerned about compliance with the 
stay.80 
This legal framework admits of two possible overreaching effects that I 
characterize as ‘asymmetric overreaching’. First, there is the possibility of globally 
extensive US cases predicated on a thimble full of US property – to mix metaphors, 
extraterritorial ‘mountains’ made out of territorial ‘molehills’. Second, there is the 
possibility of asymmetric treatment of creditors within US personal jurisdiction who are 
bound by the US case and creditors with equivalent claims who are beyond the practical 
reach of US personal jurisdiction who and can disregard the US case. Yukos81 is a case 
with both features. In Yukos, a Russian oil company acting by its chief financial officer 
filed a chapter 11 case in Houston, Texas despite having only minimal contacts in the US 
derived primarily from the deposit of funds in a US bank account shortly before the filing 
of the petition.  As a formal rather than a practical matter the case encompassed Yukos’s 
oil and gas assets all of which were in Russia. But the US stay had a practical, as well as 
a formal, effect. It prevented foreign banks that conduct business in the US – and that 
were therefore subject to US general personal jurisdiction − from bidding in an 
expropriatory tax auction of Yukos’s Russian assets organized by the Russian 
government.82 
While eligibility and commencement are virtually unrestricted, the Code has three 
mechanisms that formally check asymmetric overreaching. These are the court’s 
abstention power in section 305, the court’s power to dismiss a chapter 11 case for cause 
in section 1112(b) and the rules that govern coordination of concurrent US and foreign 
cases in sections 1528-1529. The inquiry under the first two powers is whether or not the 
case – and the protection and relief that it affords – should be allowed to continue. In 
other words, these are powers that arise after commencement rather than erecting a 
screen that must be passed through before commencement. The third mechanism – the 
coordination rules in sections 1528-1529 – affect both the commencement and scope of a 
US case. 
Under section 305, the court may dismiss or suspend a case at any time if the 
interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by dismissal or suspension or, 
alternatively, if a petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding relating to the same 
debtor has been granted and the purposes of chapter 15 would be best served by dismissal 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Rev 1. For a recent disagreement between the bankruptcy court and the district court in 
the Southern District of New York as to whether Bahrain-based defendants’ use of New 
York correspondent accounts constituted sufficient minimum contacts for the US courts 
to assert personal jurisdiction over them in avoidance actions: see Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors of Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(c) et al v Bahrain Islamic Bank (2015) 529 
BR 57 revd (2016) 549 BR 56. 
80 In re Nakash (1996) 190 BR 763; In re Simon 153 F 3d 991 (9th Cir 1998); In re Gold 
& Honey, Ltd (2013) 410 BR 357. 
81 In re Yukos Oil Co (2005) 321 BR 396. 
82 See MW Winkler, ‘Arbitration Without Privity and Russian Oil: The Yukos Case 
Before the Houston Court’ (2006) 27 U Penn J Int’l Ec L 115, 117-118. 
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or suspension. Section 305 thus enables the US court to take a step back and defer to 
foreign proceedings or allow events to unfold elsewhere.  
The power to dismiss a chapter 11 case for ‘cause’ under section 1112(b) is broad 
and open-ended. The statute enumerates a number of illustrative but non-exhaustive 
factors upon which the court can act.83 It is well settled that chapter 11 cases are 
susceptible to dismissal for cause if the case is not filed in ‘good faith’. This statutory 
gloss is designed to prevent abuse of the bankruptcy process – in particular, the filing of 
bankruptcy petitions that lack a valid reorganizational purpose and thus delay creditor 
enforcement for no good reason.84 Both powers have been used to stop forum shopped 
chapter 11 cases. However, as critics are quick − and correct − to point out, given that 
there is no initial hearing of the bankruptcy petition, the onus is on parties who object to 
the US case to file a dismissal motion once the case is up and running. And so, the 
argument goes, asymmetric cases with skewed global effects based on slim jurisdictional 
foundations can gather momentum and cause mischief in the meantime.85 Moreover, the 
fact that a debtor manufactured eligibility will not usually provide grounds for dismissal 
per se. Yukos is again illustrative. The Russian debtor filed its petition in mid-December 
of 2004.86 This prevented Deutsche Bank and other foreign banks from participating in 
the Russian auction, which took place on 19 December 2004.87 Deutsche Bank filed a 
motion to dismiss the chapter 11 case on 28 December 2004.88 The court ultimately 
dismissed the case, but not for a further two months, and it did so on a ‘totality of 
circumstances’ basis. The transfer of funds to a US bank account for the primary purpose 
of creating US bankruptcy eligibility was a factor in, but not the basis for, the dismissal.89 
Once a US court has recognized a foreign main proceeding under chapter 15, 
section 1528 has two effects. First, a full US bankruptcy case may only be commenced 
after recognition if the debtor has US assets. Second, the jurisdictional reach of the full 
US case is reined in.90 Things work differently if the full case is filed before the chapter 
15 case. In this situation, the full case is in the driver’s seat.91 But whatever the order of 
events, the Model Law’s imperatives temper the court’s jurisdiction in the full case. In 
particular, section 1529(4) expressly cross references the court’s abstention power in 
section 305 as a source of relief for ‘achieving cooperation and coordination’ between 
concurrent proceedings.  																																																								
83 11 USC 1112(b)(4). Factors include ‘substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of 
the estate and the absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation’ and specified 
instances of non-compliance with statutory rules or court orders. 
84 In re SGL Carbon Corporation 200 F 3d 154 (3rd Cir 1999); In re Integrated Telecom 
Express, Inc 384 F 3d 108 (3rd Cir 2004).	
85 McCormack (n 11) 838, 840.  
86 In re Yukos Oil Co, Chapter 11 Case No 04-47742-H3-11 (United States Bankruptcy 
Court, Southern District of Texas), Deutsche Bank AG’s Pre-Trial Brief (on file with 
author). 
87 Ibid 3. 
88 Ibid 4. 
89 In re Yukos Oil Co (2005) 321 BR 396, 410-11. 
90 11 USC 1528, 1529(2). 
91 11 USC 1529(1). 
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Thus, the risk of asymmetric overreaching is limited to cases where no insolvency 
proceeding is pending or contemplated in the debtor’s ‘home’ jurisdiction, or where an 
insolvency proceeding is pending in the debtor’s home jurisdiction, but the foreign 
representative has neither sought nor obtained chapter 15 recognition in the US. The 
cases in this limited batch will often be cases that, at point of filing, Professor Westbrook 
would characterize as US ‘solitary non-main proceedings’ − that is proceedings where ‘a 
bankruptcy petition is filed in the United States with respect to a corporate debtor whose 
center of main interests is in another country, yet bankruptcy has not been filed there.’92   
It is cases in this narrow category of solitary non-main proceedings (‘SNMPs’) 
that attract the critics’ attention. SNMPs have varying profiles. Some SNMPs are US 
cases filed pre-emptively by forum shoppers to gain an ‘first to file’ advantage before 
‘home’ proceedings are commenced at the debtor’s COMI – cases that are only SNMPs 
for a while. Yukos is one such case. Another is Cenargo,93 in which an English shipping 
company that carried on business primarily in the UK, Ireland, and elsewhere in Europe, 
filed a chapter 11 case with the aim, in part, of staying enforcement action by a UK 
creditor that had security interests in two of the company’s vessels. This case produced a 
stand-off between the US court, which was the first court seised, and the UK court, which 
later ordered the company into provisional liquidation and administration on the petition 
of the UK creditor, who was acting in violation of the global US stay.  
Other SNMPs are cases where the parties in functional control of the debtor94 
prefer to conduct a bankruptcy proceeding exclusively in the US and avoid a ‘home’ 
filing completely. These tend to be what I call ‘legal development’ cases – that is, cases 
where the underdevelopment of restructuring laws and/or the supporting institutional 
infrastructure in the debtor’s home country influences the debtor, often in conjunction 
with its senior creditors and other stakeholders, to shop for a solution in a mature and 
relatively more predictable system. In these cases, debtors seek the general advantage of 
‘better law’ as well as more case specific advantages. Avianca and In re Northshore 
Mainland Services, Inc are cases in point.95 The chapter 11 case of Arcapita Bank 
B.S.C.(c.), a Bahraini investment bank is another example.96  
The structural problem in SNMP cases is that there is no foreign proceeding to 
which the US court can defer.97 But the concern for critics is that objecting creditors are 
put to the cost and inconvenience of having to contest US jurisdiction, or institute ‘home’ 
proceedings for which US recognition can then be sought, while, in the meantime, the US 
case is gaining momentum and generating powerful constituencies – such as fee hungry 
debtor and creditors’ committee attorneys – with interests in sustaining it.98 Moreover, 
																																																								
92 Westbrook (n 43) 781.  
93 In re Cenargo International Plc (2003) 294 BR 571. 
94 Usually, a powerful constituency of coordinated lenders or bondholders. I discount 
here the possible impact of distressed debt and claims trading on power dynamics 
because of space constraints. 
95 See further Part IV below. 
96 See further Part VI below.  
97 In re Globo Comunicacoes E Participacoes SA (Globopar) (2004) 317 BR 235 (fn 13). 
98 McCormack (n 11) 840. 
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the automatic stay inconveniences creditors who wish to initiate ‘home’ proceedings but 
who also have a presence or assets in the US. 
 
B. UK jurisdiction  
 
UK bankruptcy jurisdiction over foreign entities differs in several respects from the 
corresponding jurisdiction in the US. First, the UK approach is less unitary. The winding-
up and schemes of arrangement regimes share nineteenth century origins and a common 
entry test has evolved governing their foreign application. However, winding-up and 
schemes differ procedurally and, although schemes are widely used for debt 
restructuring, they are Companies Act rather than insolvency proceedings. The 
administration regime is open only to companies formed and registered in the UK, the 
European Economic Area99 and, via a circuitous route, in designated countries whose 
courts qualify for UK cooperation under section 426 of the Insolvency Act 1986100 and 
companies, wherever registered, having their COMIs in an EEA state (with the exception 
of Denmark).101 Jurisdiction as regards company voluntary arrangements is similarly 
qualified.102  
Second, commencement of UK insolvency proceedings by, or in relation to, 
foreign entities often – though not strictly always – requires the court to make an order in 
the exercise of its discretion. Thus, while the formal procedures vary across the different 
insolvency regimes, the UK applies a screen at the outset to determine whether cases 
should be commenced whereas the US allows cases to start and then, if the appropriate 
motion is filed, determines whether they should continue. This tendency is most 
pronounced in relation to winding-up and schemes of arrangement, which I will treat as 
indicative.103 It is well established that UK courts can wind up foreign entities as 
																																																								
99 Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986), sch B1, para 111(1A)(a), (b) inserted by the 
Insolvency Act 1986 (Amendment) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/879. Strictly, the scope of 
this provision is restricted in the UK to companies registered under the Companies Act 
2006 in England and Wales or Scotland. There is separate legislation having the same 
effect governing companies registered in Northern Ireland. 
100 In re Dallhold Estates (UK) Pty Ltd [1992] BCLC 621 (Ch); In re Tambrook Jersey 
Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 576, [2014] Ch 252.  
101 IA 1986, sch B1, para 111(1A)(c), which conforms UK domestic legislation to the EU 
Insolvency Regulation and reflects the holding in In re BRAC Rent-A-Car International 
Inc [2003] EWHC 128 (Ch), [2003] 1 WLR 1421.  The exclusion of non-EEA registered 
entities with non-EEA COMIs is difficult to understand: see McCormack (n 11); G Moss 
et al, ‘A very “consequential” amendment’ (2010) 23(4) Insolv Int 57, 58. Confusion 
over whether a Cayman registered company could be placed in UK administration was 
one factor influencing the US court’s refusal to dismiss a chapter 11 case filed by that 
entity in In re Monitor Single Lift I, Ltd (2008) 381 BR 455, 468. 
102 IA 1986, s 1(4). 
103 Administrators can be appointed out of court and the company voluntary arrangement 
procedure is out of court though subject to court challenge. In practice, officeholders 
prefer the shelter of a court order confirming jurisdiction at the outset to the risk of an ex 
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‘unregistered companies’ under Part V of the Insolvency Act on various grounds, 
including inability to pay debts.104 But invariably the court will make a winding-up order 
on the petition of a creditor or contributory only after a hearing. Thus, even if the petition 
is unopposed, the court will inquire into its own jurisdiction before making the order.105  
Schemes of arrangement involve a two-step court process. The debtor entity first 
has to apply for a court order convening a scheme approval meeting and, assuming the 
various classes of creditors or members vote in favour in accordance with the statutory 
thresholds, the court must then sanction the scheme in order for it to be binding.106 While 
the court does not have to determine jurisdiction at the initial convening hearing – it can 
and sometimes does defer the question until the sanction hearing107 – the debtor and 
supporting creditors typically require comfort that the whole process will not unravel. 
Thus, in practice, the jurisdictional question is increasingly aired, albeit without being 
preclusively resolved, at the initial hearing108 and the court holds the debtor and its 
advisers to a high standard of full and frank disclosure.109 
Third, the UK does not have formal presumptive eligibility rules of the sort 
contained in section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code upon which an automatic entitlement to 
commence bankruptcy proceedings is predicated. Presence of assets within the 
jurisdiction is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for access. The approach is 
fuzzier and the debtor’s eligibility, deriving from jurisdictional contacts, is not decoupled 
from other considerations concerning the appropriateness of UK jurisdiction, as is the 
case in the US. The jurisdictional test applied both for the purposes of winding-up and 
scheme jurisdiction is whether or not the debtor has a ‘sufficient connection’ with the 
UK. And given the procedural set up, the court will apply this test as a screen regardless 
																																																																																																																																																																					
post challenge by disgruntled stakeholders: see eg S Moore, ‘COMI Migration: The 
Future’ (2009) 22(2) Insolv Int 25. 
104 IA 1986, ss 220-229. See generally IF Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International 
Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) ch 3. 
105 See, by analogy, In re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch), [2011] Bus LR 
1245 [22]-[23]. 
106 Companies Act 2006 ss 895-899; Payne (n 41). 
107 See eg In re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch), [2011] Bus LR 1245. The 
current practice direction, Practice Statement (Companies: Schemes of Arrangement) 
[2002] 1 WLR 1345, is silent on the point and in need of updating to accommodate the 
subsequent surge of foreign entity schemes: see D Hamilton, ‘A New Direction for 
Schemes’ (2015) 28(8) Insolv Int 126. 
108 See eg Primacom Holding GmbH v Credit Agricole [2011] EWHC 3746 (Ch), [2013] 
BCC 201; Cortefiel, SA v MEP 11.S.a.r.l. [2012] EWHC 998 (Ch); In re Seat Pagine 
Gialle SpA [2012] EWHC 3686 (Ch); In re Zlomrex International Finance SA [2013] 
EWHC 4605 (Ch), [2014] BCC 440; In re Van Gansewinkel Groep BV [2015] EWHC 
2151 (Ch), [2016] Bus LR 1046 [55]-[56]; In re Indah Kiat International Finance Co BV 
[2016] EWHC 246 (Ch), [2016] BCC 418 [85]-[89]. 
109 In re Van Gansewinkel Groep BV [2015] EWHC 2151 (Ch), [2016] Bus LR 1046; 
Nordic Trustee ASA v OGX Petroleo E Gas SA [2016] EWHC 25 (Ch), [2016] Bus LR 
121. 
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of whether or not a winding-up petition or an application to convene scheme approval 
meetings is opposed. 
According to the oft-cited modern formulation of the ‘sufficient connection’ test 
put forward by Knox J in Re Real Estate Development Co,110 there are three ‘core 
requirements’: 
 
(1) that there must be a sufficient connection with the UK which may, but does     
not necessarily have to, consist of assets within the jurisdiction; 
(2) that there must be a reasonable possibility if a winding-up order is made, of  
benefit to those applying for the winding-up order; 
(3) one or more persons interested in the distribution of assets of the company 
must be persons over whom the court can exercise a jurisdiction.  
 
These ‘requirements’ are not applied mechanically as if they were statutory predicates for 
the exercise of jurisdiction.111 UK courts are generally reluctant to make a winding-up 
order where the foreign entity has no UK assets or is continuing to trade in its place of 
incorporation or elsewhere.112 However, even in the absence of UK assets, a winding-up 
order may be made to enable a liquidator to investigate and pursue causes of action under 
UK law that could produce benefits for creditors.113 In exercising their discretion, UK 
courts invariably consider whether another venue would be more appropriate.114 Overall, 
the analysis of jurisdictional contacts is blended with other factors, including the 
appropriateness of the UK as a forum and the extent to which a winding-up can feasibly 
be conducted in the UK for the benefit of parties subject to UK jurisdiction.  
 The same test is applied, with adjustments, to foreign entity schemes.115  As 
schemes are used to restructure financial obligations rather than collect and distribute 
assets, ‘sufficient connection’ is tested by reference to the proposed restructuring 
objective, not winding-up.116 UK courts focus on the transactional relationships enshrined 
in the debtor’s financing documents and will exercise scheme jurisdiction where 
creditors’ have agreed to their rights being governed expressly by English law, and to 																																																								
110 [1991] BCLC 210. 
111 In re Latreefers Inc [2001] BCC 174 (CA) [30] (Morritt LJ). See also Re Rodenstock 
GmbH [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch), [2011] Bus LR 1245, [22]. 
112 Banco Nacional de Cuba v Cosmos Trading Corp [2000] BCC 910, 915 (CA). 
113 In re a Company (No 00359 of 1987) [1988] Ch 210 (Ch) 210, 221-228; In re 
Latreefers Inc [2001] BCC 174 (CA).  
114 In re Latreefers Inc [2001] BCC 174, 180 (Ch); In re Buccament Bay Ltd [2014] 
EWHC 4776 (Ch), [2015] 1 BCLC 646 [20]; K Dawson, ‘The Doctrine of Forum Non 
Conveniens and the Winding Up of Insolvent Foreign Companies’ [2005] JBL 28. 
115 In re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch), [2011] Bus LR 1245 [20]; In re 
Zlomrex International Finance SA [2013] EWHC 4605 (Ch), [2014] BCC 440 [12]; In re 
APCOA Parking Holdings GmbH (No 2) [2014] EWCH 3849 (Ch), [2015] Bus LR 374 
[208]-[220]. 
116 In re Drax Holdings Ltd [2003] EWHC 2743 (Ch); [2004] 1 WLR 1049 [29]-[31]; In 
re APCOA Parking Holdings GmbH (No 2) [2014] EWCH 3849 (Ch), [2015] Bus LR 
374 [215]. 
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submit to UK jurisdiction,117 even if the debtor’s COMI is elsewhere. It is generally 
assumed that a UK scheme discharging or modifying a foreign entity’s English law 
governed obligations will be recognized in other EU member states under English and 
EU choice of law principles.118 Foreign entities can therefore implement pan-EU schemes 
without moving their COMIs to the UK.  Schemes are also used to modify debt 
obligations of foreign entities governed by New York law. To create a ‘sufficient 
connection’ for UK jurisdiction and export these schemes to the US via chapter 15, 
foreign entities have used a variety of mechanisms, including COMI migrations, UK 
establishments and the formation of UK group entities.119 Thus, debtors can easily 
establish UK scheme jurisdiction and the law is highly facilitative of inbound forum 
shopping. Courts tolerate the manufacturing of jurisdiction through techniques such as 
COMI migration120 or amendment of governing law clauses.121 But the court’s discretion 																																																								
117 In re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch), [2011] Bus LR 1245 [66]-[69]; 
Primacom Holding GmbH v Credit Agricole [2011] EWHC 3746 (Ch), [2013] BCC 201; 
Re Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group [2013] EWHC 2476 (Ch), [2014] BCC 433; In 
re APCOA Parking Holdings GmbH (No 2) [2014] EWCH 3849 (Ch), [2015] Bus LR 
374 [217]-[218]. 
118 In re Drax Holdings Ltd [2003] EWHC 2743 (Ch), [2004] 1 WLR 1049 [30]; In re 
Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch), [2011] Bus LR 1245 [73]-[77]; Magyar 
Telecom BV [2013] EWHC 3800 (Ch), [2014] BCC 448 [22]-[23]; Regulation (EC) No 
593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ L177/6 art 12(1)(d). Schemes 
may also qualify for pan-EU recognition under the Recast Brussels Regulation (n 41) 
though there is some doubt over whether schemes fall within its scope: see eg In re Van 
Gansewinkel Groep BV [2015] EWHC 2151 (Ch), [2016] Bus LR 1046 and discussion in 
R Olivares-Caminal et al, Debt Restructuring (2nd edn, OUP 2016) 2.127-2.139.  
119 Text to nn 40-42 and, on what is required for successful COMI migration, see In re 
Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA [2010] BCC 295. UK courts cannot 
open main insolvency proceedings in relation to entities if their COMIs are elsewhere in 
the EU because of the effect of the EU Insolvency Regulation. According to the 
Companies Act 2006 s 895(2)(b) a company ‘liable to be wound up under the Insolvency 
Act 1986’ may propose a scheme. As schemes are outside the scope of the Regulation, 
courts have read section 895(2)(b) as referring to their residual winding-up jurisdiction, 
hence the application of the ‘sufficient connection’ test: see In re Rodenstock GmbH 
[2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch), [2011] Bus LR 1245 [17]-[19], [35]-[63]; In re Van 
Gansewinkel Groep BV [2015] EWHC 2151 (Ch), [2016] Bus LR 1046 [29]-[54]; Payne 
(n 41). For cases in which schemes were recognized in the US as foreign non-main 
proceedings based on the presence of an establishment in the foreign jurisdiction see In re 
Hibu, Inc, Case No 8-14-70323-reg (United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of 
New York, 27 Feb 2014); In re Winsway Enterprises Holdings Ltd, Case No 16-10833-
mg (United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern District New York, 16 Jun 2016). 
120 In re Magyar Telecom BV [2013] EWHC 3800 (Ch), [2014] BCC 448; In re Codere 
Finance (UK) Ltd [2015] EWHC (Ch) 3778 [13]-[19]. 
121 In re APCOA Parking Holdings GmbH (No 2) [2014] EWCH 3849 (Ch), [2015] Bus 
LR 374; In re DTEK Finance BV [2015] EWHC 1164 (Ch). 
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is formally bounded by concerns about the enforceability of UK schemes in other 
jurisdictions. 122 Courts will not allow cases to proceed that will achieve no practical 
purpose; expert evidence as to the likelihood of overseas recognition is routinely 
sought.123  
 The same pragmatism that views jurisdiction as tempered by practicability of 
enforcement also influences judicial views as to the territorial extent of UK insolvency 
and restructuring law. A UK winding-up has worldwide effect meaning that it extends to 
assets wherever situated.124 However, courts acknowledge the practical limits of this 
worldwide claim.125 And, in contrast to the US, UK insolvency law has no automatic, 
worldwide stay. Instead, UK courts use anti-suit injunctions to restrain parties amenable 
to their personal jurisdiction from grabbing assets overseas in violation of UK rules of 
distribution and priority.126 The powerful preference at common law is for any UK 
winding-up of a foreign entity to be ancillary to a principal winding up taking place in the 
entity’s place of incorporation.127 SNMPs are possible – especially in legal development 																																																								
122 In re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch), [2011] Bus LR 1245 [73]-[77]; In 
re Magyar Telecom BV [2013] EWHC 3800 (Ch), [2014] BCC 448 [21]-[22]; In re 
DTEK Finance BV [2015] EWHC 1164 (Ch) [19]. 
123 In re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch), [2011] Bus LR 1245 [73]-[77]; In 
re Magyar Telecom BV [2013] EWHC 3800 (Ch), [2014] BCC 448 [19]-[20]; In re 
APCOA Parking Holdings GmbH (No 2) [2014] EWCH 3849 (Ch) , [2015] Bus LR 374 
[246]-[249], [258]-[279] ; In re DTEK Finance BV [2015] EWHC 1164 (Ch) [16]. 
124 In re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 WLR 852 
[8], [68]-[69]; Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2014] UKPC 36, 
[2015] AC 1675 [10]; Stichting Shell Pensioenfonds v Krys [2014] UKPC 41, [2015] AC 
616 [14]-[15]; Bilta (UK) Ltd v Nazir [2015] UKSC 23, [2016] AC 1 [109]-[110]; Sir 
Peter Millett, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency: The Judicial Approach’ (1997) 6 Int Insolv Rev 
99  (‘The basic rules of UK domestic law are not in doubt: an English winding-up order 
is deemed to have worldwide effect; and in the winding-up the court applies English law, 
both procedural and substantive.’). 
125 In re International Tin Council [1987] 1 Ch 419 (Ch) 446G-447A; Banco Nacional de 
Cuba v Cosmos Trading Corp [2000] BCC 910 (CA) 915-916.  
126 Mitchell v Carter [1997] 1 BCLC 673, 687; Stichting Shell Pensioenfonds v Krys 
[2014] UKPC 41, [2015] AC 616 [14]-[26] (reviewing the authorities). The anti-suit 
jurisdiction is carefully circumscribed: see Millett (n 124) 106-107. See also Fletcher (n 
104) 103-104. The UK’s residual approach to personal jurisdiction (ie where EU/EEA 
law does not apply) is broad but differently configured from the US approach and rests 
on the amenability of a party to service of process: see CPR Pt 6.  Parties can be served 
outside the jurisdiction with the permission of the court in certain circumstances: CPR rr 
6.30(b); 6.36-6.37; CPR PD 6B para 3.1; Altimo Holdings and Investment Ltd v Kyrgyz 
Mobil Tel Ltd [2011] UKPC 7; [2012] 1WLR 1804 [71]-[102]. 
127 In re Vocalion (Foreign) Limited [1932] 2 Ch 196 (Ch) 206-207; In re Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International SA (No 10) [1997] Ch 213 (Ch) 238-248; In re HIH 
Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 WLR 852 [8]-[11]; 
Rubin v Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236 [13], [18]; Singularis 
Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2014] UKPC 36, [2015] AC 1675 [10]; 
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cases or cases where there is a technical obstacle to a ‘home’ proceeding128 – but courts 
prefer to avoid them. Thus, while the worldwide scope of the winding-up jurisdiction as 
regards assets reflects the UK’s imperial past,129 the jurisdictional claim is formally more 
circumspect than its US counterpart. The reach of scheme jurisdiction is similarly 
bounded by concerns about international recognition and enforcement. Moreover, as a 
scheme is a Companies Act voting mechanism rather than a formal insolvency 
proceeding, there is no mandatory stay. UK courts may, though, grant a stay to prevent 
dissentients from enforcing their claims where a scheme that commands substantial 
creditor support has been worked out but not yet formally proposed or voted on.130 In 
keeping with the equitable maxim, UK courts prefer not to act in vain. 
 In sum, then, the UK-US formal comparison supports the critics’ position to a 
considerable extent. Although scheme jurisdiction is conducive to forum shopping 
through ex ante manipulation of choice of law, UK law and procedure requires the court 
to inquire into its jurisdiction as a matter of course and practical enforceability concerns 
temper the extent of the formal jurisdictional claim. Global cases reinforced by global 
stays do not come about automatically at the flick of a proverbial switch. The formal 
scope for asymmetric overreach is small. In the US, a domestic bankruptcy case and a 
foreign entity SNMP case are treated the same statutorily. If the debtor is eligible and 
files a petition, a globally extensive case, supported by the automatic stay, goes into 
immediate effect and continues unless the court sua sponte takes up the question of its 
jurisdiction or until the court is presented with satisfactory grounds to dismiss the case on 
the motion of an objecting party. The formal scope for asymmetric overreach is 
considerable especially as international stakeholders amenable to US jurisdiction through 
connections with financial centres such as New York are automatically in legal jeopardy. 
 
IV. US BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN ENTITIES IN PRACTICE 
 
Both the UK and US systems are open for business to bankruptcy forum shoppers and 
case placers. Both offer ‘restructuring friendly’ environments in global financial centres. 
Chapter 11 is seen as being formally more sophisticated than the UK scheme not least 
because of its rules on class formation, cramdown, debtor-in-possession financing and 
executory contracts.131 But the UK is currently the US’s strongest market rival132 and the 
choice between a chapter 11 filing and a UK scheme, especially in the context of 																																																																																																																																																																					
Stichting Shell Pensioenfonds v Krys [2014] UKPC 41, [2015] AC 616 [14]-[15]. For 
background, see Fletcher (n 104) 211-214. 
128 In re a Company (No 003102 of 1991) ex p Nyckeln Finance Co [1991] BCLC 539 
(Ch); In re Buccament Bay Ltd [2014] EWHC 4776 (Ch), [2015] 1 BCLC 646 [21]. 
129 L Hoffmann, ‘Cross-Border Insolvency: A British Perspective’ (1996) 64 Fordham 
LR 2507. 
130 Bluecrest Mercantile Bv v Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group [2013] EWHC 1146 
(Comm). Of course, if the scheme is being worked on before the debtor defaults, a stay is 
unnecessary. 
131 Couwenberg & Lubben (n 7); McCormack (n 11) 826-828. 
132 Couwenberg & Lubben (n 7).  Whether or not the UK can retain its status as the de 
facto restructuring capital of Europe post-Brexit remains to be seen.  
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financial restructuring, may depend as much on the appetite of key stakeholders for each 
process as on their perceived formal advantages and disadvantages. We have seen that 
US bankruptcy jurisdiction is more prone to asymmetric overreach than its UK 
counterpart. But formal possibilities are one thing, functional realities quite another.  
Indeed, it is plausible to suppose that the way that US bankruptcy courts actually 
exercise jurisdiction in practice in SNMP cases is at least somewhat restrained and 
jurisdictionally congruent more often than not. Borrowing from Miles Kahler and Kal 
Raustiala,133 by ‘jurisdictionally congruent’ I mean jurisdiction exercised in a fashion 
predominantly, if not perfectly, coterminous with the court’s own territory that affects 
parties and assets within the practical limits of the court’s enforcement powers. My claim 
then is that US courts – and case placers – (unsurprisingly) prefer effective power to 
external projections of ineffective power just as much as their UK counterparts. I develop 
this point by reference to what I called ‘focused restructuring’ and the aforementioned 
legal development cases.  
 
A. Focused restructuring 
 
For cases to be successful, it makes sense for case placers to structure them in ways that 
impair the claims of creditors against whom enforcement can realistically be achieved 
while leaving unimpaired the claims of non-US stakeholders located in jurisdictions 
which are not guaranteed to provide enforcement assistance to the US court. As 
Couwenberg and Lubben explain, the flexibility of the creditor classification rules in 
chapter 11 allows ‘the American courts to tailor the chapter 11 procedure to match the 
scope of the court’s power.’134 Thus, different categories of unsecured creditor can be 
separately classified and accorded separate treatment – junior bondholders in the 
financial capital structure can be impaired while trade creditors of the operating business 
are paid in full.135 This means that financial and operational restructuring can be 
partitioned ex ante through corporate group structures and ex post through bankruptcy 
law.136  
Foreign entity bankruptcy cases can therefore take the form of a forensically 
targeted bond restructuring in the group holding vehicle that ‘follows the money’ to its 
source.137 If the restructuring deal the non-US debtor needs to do is with the holders of 
New York law governed high yield bonds who are all amenable to US personal 
jurisdiction, it makes practical sense to use US chapter 11 to implement that deal 
regardless of where the debtor’s COMI is located. This type of financial restructuring, 
focused on a specific crisis in the debtor’s capital structure, is functionally equivalent to 																																																								
133 K Raustiala, ‘The evolution of territoriality: international relations & American law’ 
in M Kahler & BF Walter (eds), Territoriality and Conflict in an Age of Globalization 
(Cambridge University Press 2006).  
134 Couwenberg & Lubben (n 7) 741.  
135 Ibid 721. 
136 Professor Rasmussen was alive to this trend a decade ago: see RK Rasmussen, ‘Where 
Are All the Transnational Bankruptcies? The Puzzling Case for Universalism’ (2007) 32 
Brooklyn J Intl L 983. 
137 See Mayr (n 4), Couwenberg & Lubben (n 7), Rasmussen (n 136). 
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foreign entity schemes of arrangement in the UK. Often, the objective of the case is to 
impose a largely consensual restructuring, via a prepackaged plan, on a minority of active 
‘holdout’ creditors or a minority of non-opposing creditors who cannot be traced.138 The 
chapter 11 case filed by Chilean bus operator Inversiones Alsacia SA to consummate an 
exchange offer with its noteholders – mainly US-based asset managers – is a good 
example.139 In this case, the Santiago-based company, which held seven bank accounts in 
New York, confirmed a prepackaged chapter 11 plan that impaired only senior secured 
noteholders. Meanwhile, the Chilean trade creditors and employees were paid and the 
buses continued to run.140 
With debt overhang remaining a problem for banks in the post-financial crisis 
world, the shift from bank to high yield debt finance will likely consolidate further and 
focused restructuring will continue to predominate. As US bankruptcy jurisdiction is 
exercised congruently in focused restructuring cases, abusive forum shopping, 
characterized by the filing of asymmetrically skewed cases, is unlikely to be a large 
problem in practice. Of course, given the scope of the US’s formal claims, asymmetric 
cases can be commenced that constrain creditors amenable to US jurisdiction in relation 
to non-US assets and contribute to inter-creditor strife. Thus, even though the attempt in 
Yukos to forestall enforcement of, and subordinate, Russian tax claims was 
understandable,141 criticism of Yukos is justified because a full reorganization of an entity 
with a Russian COMI binding on assets and claims in Russia was never realistic without 
the cooperation of the Russian authorities. But Yukos is an outlier. The more asymmetric 																																																								
138 Mayr (n 4). Many cases therefore amount to private restructurings that need a formal 
process for ‘belt and braces’ purposes. For an account of how modern capital structures 
are facilitative of private – and therefore focused or concentrated – restructuring see 
Schwartz (n 38). 
139 SJ Lubben, ‘Corporate Bankruptcy Tourists Land in U.S.’, New York Times, 31 
October 2014.  
140 For an earlier example see In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd (2000) 251 BR 31. The 
case is controversial because eligibility was manufactured by the depositing of an 
attorney’s retainer. But the purpose of the filing was to shore up a largely consensual 
restructuring in which the only impaired creditors were holders of US bond debt. 
Opinions differ about In re Cenargo International Plc (2003) 294 BR 571, a case in 
which a UK debtor’s pre-emptive US chapter 11 filing led for a while to a stand-off 
between the US and UK courts. On one view, the debtor’s board was using the filing to 
avoid the management displacement effects of an English insolvency proceeding and 
impose the US stay on an English secured creditor who had interests in two of Cenargo’s 
vessels. On another view, the US case involved a legitimate attempt at a focused 
restructuring of US bond debt responding to the most pressing crisis in the capital 
structure that was designed also to prevent the secured creditor from taking precipitate 
enforcement action but without impairing its substantive rights: see (2003) 294 BR 571, 
577-580, 603.  
141 Some aspects of the Russian government’s tax assessment and enforcement process 
were subsequently found to have violated article 6 and article 1 of the first protocol of the 
European Convention on Human Rights: OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v Russia 
(2012) 54 EHRR 19 (European Court of Human Rights). 
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the US case (eg a ‘peppercorn’ case that purports to affect worldwide assets and claims) 
and the broader the bankruptcy purpose sought to be achieved, the less likely the case 
will survive.  
 
B. Legal development cases: Avianca and Northshore Mainland 
 
Yukos is fair game. The case was eventually flushed but not before the automatic stay had 
done its work. Criticism of Avianca is harder to understand. To be sure, as the national 
airline of Colombia, Avianca’s COMI and the preponderance of its assets were in 
Colombia. But this was not a ‘peppercorn’ case and its US connections were not 
manufactured. Avianca had planes flying in and out of Miami and New York that were 
susceptible to creditor seizure in the US. Avianca needed access for liquidity purposes to 
cash collateral in the form of US credit card receivables held in US accounts. By modern 
jurisdictional standards, Avianca had a US establishment.  
The imperative behind the filing was Avianca’s need to renegotiate its aircraft 
leases, the costs of which were a major drag on its business. The powers of a debtor-in-
possession in section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code to assume or reject leases provided 
Avianca with leverage in this respect.142 The chapter 11 case survived a section 305 
challenge by a disgruntled creditor and the airline emerged from bankruptcy under new 
ownership with fresh investment. It operates to this day. Moreover, because Avianca had 
the economic clout to negotiate a successful out-of-court ‘standstill’ with its non-US 
creditors so as to ensure parity of treatment between US creditors and non-US creditors, 
the bankruptcy court acted in a remarkably restrained and jurisdictionally congruent 
fashion. If we judge Avianca by reference to the legal and practical context in which it 
arose, the case epitomizes the ‘art of the possible.’ 
Critics are uneasy about Avianca. Universalists say that the airline should have 
filed its main proceeding in Colombia. At the time the case commenced (March 2003), 
Colombia had a four-year-old reorganization law in place, although this did not permit 
rejection of leases.143 Sovereigntists dislike what they see as US encroachment on 
Colombian sovereignty. But the practical alternatives to an SNMP were for Avianca: (i) 
to file for reorganization under an untested Colombian law and seek discretionary relief 
in the US to protect the aircraft and access the cash collateral;144 or (ii) to file concurrent 
proceedings in Colombia and the US and try to coordinate ‘mirror’ plans in two 
jurisdictions with conflicting laws. Given the risks associated with these alternatives, 
Avianca and its Colombian stakeholders can hardly be faulted for using the US 
bankruptcy system, well versed as it is in aviation cases, to deal with Avianca’s American 
stakeholders. A reasonable interpretation of Avianca is that the airline, in conjunction 
with its Colombian stakeholders, chose in real time the option of a plan that would bind 
its American stakeholders over perceptibly weaker alternatives, involving the pursuit of a 
																																																								
142 Albeit aircraft lessors have special protections in 11 USC §1110. 
143 Westbrook (n 43) 787-789. 
144 Under 11 USC §304, the statutory predecessor of chapter 15. 
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large de facto test case under a relatively new law in a less than robust judicial and 
institutional environment,145 that required active US cooperation to succeed. 
Avianca is a ‘hard’ case that pragmatists and consequentialists find easier to 
accept than universalists and sovereigntists. With no foreign proceeding to defer to what 
was the US court supposed to do faced with a foreign debtor that clearly needed relief? 
Forcibly reallocate the case to Colombia by closing the US case down against the wishes 
of the debtor and the majority of its US stakeholders and risk damage to the US business 
in the meantime? The main risk of the creative placement was discrimination against US 
creditors who were squarely within the US court’s enforcement jurisdiction. But the court 
insisted that US general creditors receive the same treatment as their Colombian 
counterparts.146 I do not deny that the case leaves difficult choice of law questions 
unanswered. Universalists favour the application of COMI bankruptcy law and ask why 
US bankruptcy law should impinge on the aircraft leases.147 Perhaps this question could 
have been addressed in coordinated concurrent proceedings. We will never know.148 The 
purpose of my narrative is to suggest that the exercise of jurisdiction in Avianca was 
careful not exorbitant. The way the case actually functioned in terms of reach and 
applicable law can fairly be characterized as equivalent to a territorial insolvency 
proceeding under the EU Insolvency Regulation.149  
In re Northshore Mainland Services, Inc150 is a legal development case with 
features that differentiate it from Avianca. Avianca was mostly consensual; the 
jurisdictional fight in Northshore was merely one battle in a wider inter-stakeholder 
conflict. Avianca predates US enactment of the Model Law; Northshore arose a decade 
after the US enacted the Model Law. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the 
Northshore case could only ever have succeeded with the active cooperation of the 
debtor’s ‘home’ court because its objectives were more far reaching.  
In Northshore, the Bahamian developer of a huge resort complex called Baha 
Mar, described in the record as ‘one of the most significant single-phase resorts under 
																																																								
145 The Colombian government only recently agreed a peace deal with the FARC rebels 
after more than half a century of internal conflict: see ‘Colombia nears a peace deal with 
FARC rebels’, New York Times, 23 September 2015; ‘Colombia peace deal with FARC is 
hailed as new model for ending conflicts’, The Observer, 26 September 2015; ‘FARC 
peace deal: rebels and Colombian government sign accord to end war’, The Guardian, 25 
August 2016. The peace deal was narrowly rejected in a referendum: ‘Colombia Peace 
Deal is Defeated, Leaving a Nation in Shock’, New York Times, 2 October 2016. 
146 In re Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia S.A. Avianca, Chapter 11 Case Nos. 03-
11678-ALG, Debtors’ Motion and Order for Entry of an Order Authorizing Payment or 
Honoring of Prepetition Obligations to Certain Creditors Asserting Nominal Claim 
Amounts Against Debtors’ Estates, 4-5 June 2003 (on file with author). 
147 Westbrook (n 43) 788. 
148 More than a decade later, choice of law harmonization in international insolvencies 
has not progressed far outside the EU and has only recently begun to attract attention at 
UNCITRAL: see eg Clift (n 27). 
149 EU Insolvency Regulation, recitals (23)-(24), (37)-(38), arts 3(2)-(4), 7, 35. 
150 (2015) 537 BR 192. 
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development in the western hemisphere’,151 ran out of cash before construction could be 
completed. The project was financed by $2.45 billion of inward investment from a 
Chinese bank. The project got behind schedule with the result that the developer, who 
had a significant equity stake, could no longer work productively with the main 
contractor, another Chinese entity. The Bahamian government was stuck between a rock 
and a hard place. It needed the developer to finish the project for political and economic 
reasons152 while keeping its foreign investors happy. 
Several Bahamian registered entities in the developer’s group and the group’s sole 
US subsidiary filed chapter 11 cases in the District of Delaware. The US subsidiary had a 
place of business in Florida and, collectively, the various debtors had approximately 
$11.8 million in US bank accounts. The developer manufactured the eligibility of seven 
of the Bahamian entities by depositing $10,000 per entity in US bank accounts two weeks 
before the bankruptcy filing. Bankruptcy court approval for a debtor-in-possession 
facility of $80 million to fund payroll and operating expenses was sought and obtained. 
The developer also sought recognition of the chapter 11 proceedings in the Bahamas.  
The Bahamian government responded by petitioning for the winding-up of the 
Bahamian entities and the appointment of provisional liquidators. The Chinese parties 
and the government also opposed recognition of the chapter 11 cases, which was duly 
denied by the Bahamian court. The Chinese parties then asked the Delaware court to 
dismiss the chapter 11 cases relating to the Bahamian entities on various grounds. The 
court ruled that the debtors were all clearly eligible to file153 and the court refused to 
dismiss the cases for ‘bad faith’ filing under section 1112(b).154 It accepted (as the 
developer conceded) that the developer was trying to wrest control of the project away 
from the Chinese parties. But this did not support a determination that the filing was in 
‘bad faith’.155  
Nevertheless, the court dismissed all bar the US subsidiary’s case under section 
305(a)(1) on the ground that ‘the interests of the debtors and creditors would best be 
served by dismissal’.156 In determining whether to dismiss a bankruptcy case under 
section 305(a)(1) courts weigh and balance several factors.157 The court gave some 																																																								
151 Ibid 196. 
152 According to the record, ‘[o]nce completed, the Baha Mar Resort will generate nearly 
5,000 jobs and is projected to have annual payroll in excess of $130 million representing 
12% of the GDP of The Bahamas’: ibid. The government is up for reelection in 2017. 
153 Northshore (2015) 537 BR 192, 200-201. 
154 Ibid 201-203. 
155 And was prepared to inject new capital: Northshore (2015) 537 BR 192, 197 (‘The 
Developer owns and controls the DIP Lender’). However, the $80 million debtor-in-
possession facility was conditioned on Bahamian court recognition of the chapter 11 
cases. 
156 Ibid 203-208. 
157 (1) The economy and efficiency of administration; (2) whether another forum is 
available to protect the interests of both parties or there is already pending a proceeding 
in state court; (3) whether federal proceedings are necessary to reach a just and equitable 
solution; (4) whether there is an alternative means of achieving an equitable distribution 
of assets; (5) whether the debtor and creditors are able to work out a less expensive out-
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weight to the developer’s preference for US reorganization. But the thrust of the 
dismissal opinion is that this was a massive Bahamian ‘single asset real estate’ case, 
which implicated powerful Bahamian national interests, and it was best therefore for the 
US court to withdraw. In so concluding, the court sidestepped the developer’s argument 
that chapter 11 is superior to the alternatives under Bahamian law although the argument 
has considerable force. The insolvency system in the Bahamas is based on English law as 
it stood before the Insolvency Act 1986. The formal alternatives are restricted to 
liquidation, receivership, and schemes, and the law has not yet caught up even with the 
late twentieth century trend toward rescue-oriented insolvency law. But even though the 
court was bullish about the utility of a chapter 11 case ‘with all stakeholders 
participating’, it deferred to the home court’s view that Bahamian law equipped 
‘provisional liquidators with limited powers to preserve the Debtors’ assets while 
promoting a scheme/plan of compromise among all stakeholders.’158 The Delaware court 
recognized the limits of its own jurisdiction and acted accordingly. It allocated 
governance authority to the home court explicitly out of comity to the Bahamian court 
and implicitly because a US case was unfeasible. The case illustrates that US courts will 
defer on something approximating to forum non conveniens grounds where proceedings 
are initiated in the ‘home’ jurisdiction.  
   
V. US REGULATION OF FORUM SHOPPING: TOWARDS FUNCTIONAL 
CONVERGENCE AND GREATER UNIVERSALISM? 
 
So far my thesis is that cases like Yukos are probably outliers because, despite the 
formally more aggressive posture of US bankruptcy law, US courts generally exercise 
bankruptcy jurisdiction in jurisdictionally congruent ways that reflect feasibility 
constraints. But what of the objection that the US bankruptcy system’s formal 
configuration still permits the filing of too many needless or abusive cases that would be 
better screened out of the system on Day One, especially bearing in mind the automatic 
effects of US filings, combined with the reach of US personal jurisdiction?159 Thus, one 
might argue that the low bar to eligibility in Northshore incentivized the developer to file 
a needless, asymmetrically skewed chapter 11 case that put other stakeholders in legal 																																																																																																																																																																					
of-court arrangement which better serves all interests in the case; (6) whether a non-
federal insolvency has proceeded so far in those proceedings that it would be costly and 
time consuming to start afresh with the federal bankruptcy process; and (7) the purpose 
for which bankruptcy jurisdiction has been sought: Northshore (2015) 537 BR 192, 203-
204. 
158 Ibid 205-206. At the time of writing, the Baha Mar case was finally approaching 
resolution. The Chinese bank appointed receivers under its security and the receivers 
have apparently sold the partially completed resort to an undisclosed buyer: ‘Baha Mar to 
be Sold Twice as Court Process Ends’, Tribune 242, 3 October 2016, <http://www.tribune242.com/news/2016/oct/03/baha-mar-be-sold-twice-court-process-
ends/>.   
159 Concerns about the automatic global reach of US law are fueled by divergent 
international approaches to personal jurisdiction and so must be taken seriously. See R 
Michaels, ‘Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction’ (2006) 27 Mich J Int’l L 1003. 
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jeopardy and was always destined to be a costly, distracting, and ultimately futile 
sideshow. Couldn’t the US just deter this kind of filing by raising the eligibility threshold 
for foreign entities and/or insisting that the court apply a forum non conveniens test sua 
sponte as soon as the case commences? 
 While the US could consider toughening its eligibility criteria, it is unlikely to go 
down this path for legal cultural reasons already outlined in Part IIIA.160 It will prefer 
instead to regulate abusive forum shopping through sections 305 and 1112(b) bolstered 
by considerations of international comity and by procedural mechanisms, including 
sanctions against abusive filers and their attorneys. There are already moves afoot by the 
National Bankruptcy Conference, a prestigious group of practitioners, scholars and 
judges, to persuade Congress to amend section 305 to further limit scope for 
asymmetrically skewed SNMP cases.161  The amendment would give bankruptcy courts 
power to dismiss or suspend a US bankruptcy case if ‘the debtor’s center of main 
interests is not the United States and the court cannot exercise control over either the 
debtor or the debtor’s material assets.’ If enacted, the NBC amendment would reinforce 
chapter 15’s inbuilt preference for supplementary jurisdiction and further bias the US 
system towards jurisdictional congruence. But even without the NBC amendment, which, 
to my mind, endorses the outcomes in Avianca, Yukos and Northshore, there are reasons 
to think that the functional gap between US and UK regulation of bankruptcy forum 
shopping is already narrower than the formal gap.  
 The first reason rests on an assumption, derived from complexity theory, that 
legal systems for allocating and coordinating governance authority are complex adaptive 
systems that evolve.162 Yukos and Avianca were decided over ten years ago. At that time, 
US courts had only recently arrived at the settled view of US law that I described in Part 
IIIA.163 Since then, dynamic interactions between case placers and courts have produced 
a body of evolving case law on sections 305 and 1112(b) that has likely generated 
feedback loops that operate recursively to regulate the behaviour of case placers and their 
forum shopping clientele.164 If the odds are that the case will not survive a challenge, it is 																																																								
160 On path dependency with particular reference to US exceptionalism in the bankruptcy 
context see I Ramsay, ‘US Exceptionalism, Historical Institutionalism, and the 
Comparative Study of Consumer Bankruptcy Law’ (2015) 87 Temp L Rev 947. 
161 See letter of 27 January 2016 Congress: <http://newnbc.wpengine.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/NBC-Ltr-to-Cong-re-Ch-15-Amendments2.pdf>. 
162 See eg J Webb, ‘Law, Ethics and Complexity: Complexity Theory & the Normative 
Reconstruction of Law’ (2005) 52 Clev St L Rev 227. 
163 In re Globo Comunicacoes E Participacoes SA (Globpar) (2004) 317 BR 235 
illustrates the point. In Globopar, the bankruptcy court dismissed an involuntary 
bankruptcy proceeding against a Brazilian entity on grounds of ineligibility and abuse of 
process. On appeal, the district court reversed for error and remanded the case to the 
bankruptcy court directing it to consider dismissal under section 305(a)(1). 
164 Webb (n 162) 234 (‘Complexity theory…emphasizes the importance of “emergence” 
– the idea that complexity is a (spontaneous) product of the behavior of the system, in the 
sense that there is no external telos or design shaping the process, and “feedback” which 
creates loops in the interaction, so that events, communications, feedback on themselves, 
sometime instantaneously, sometimes after a number of intervening stages. The critical 
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not worth filing unless it would yield a swift, decisive negotiating ‘win’ between 
commencement and dismissal. Thus, repeat patterns in governance allocation decisions 
will have shadow effects that constrain future behaviour.165 Any attempt to provide a 
snapshot of the ‘American approach’ is inevitably stylized because the decentralized 
administration of the Bankruptcy Code leaves scope for different local approaches,166 
which, in turn, influence forum shopping behaviour internally within the US. Thus, in 
presenting a synthetic view I may have conceded too much ground to the critics.167 Be 
that as it may, my claim in a nutshell is that the ‘American approach’ around the turn of 
the century is not preserved in aspic. Complexity theory suggests that evolving practice 
under the dismissal standards will inevitably have affected behaviour. 
 The second reason is that, although there is no formal hearing of a debtor’s 
petition,168 US courts do operate various types of process constraint. Procedural sanctions 
can be applied to attorneys and their clients that will further lengthen the shadow effect of 
case law applying the dismissal standards. Procedural responses will vary depending on 
the grounds for dismissal. In the TMT case in which twenty three non-US shipping 
companies manufactured eligibility in the Southern District of Texas, the bankruptcy 
court conditioned denial of a motion to dismiss on the debtors furnishing to the estates 
over $40 million of what the court’s order described as ‘good faith property’ stipulated, 
among other things, to ensure compliance with court orders and provide a fund for 
payment of any sanctions ordered by the court against one or more of the debtors.169 
Sanctions against attorneys for bad faith ‘peppercorn’ filings that serve no meaningful 
purpose170 might well be contemplated on grounds of abuse of process.  
But even if the filing is judged to be in good faith, courts can use procedural 
mechanisms to influence future behaviour. Thus, in Cenargo, the debtor’s attorneys were 
docked $140,000 in fees to reflect additional litigation costs attributable to their decision 
to file only under chapter 11 instead of coordinating concurrent filings in the US and the 																																																																																																																																																																					
point is thus that the system’s outputs recursively determine its future inputs.’). On 
feedback loops in the context of transnational litigation see also PK Bookman, ‘Once and 
Future US Litigation’ in PB Stephan (ed), Foreign Court Judgments and the United 
States Legal System (Brill 2014). 
165 Whytock (n 37) 96-101. 
166 Ramsay (n 160) 953 (‘[T]he decentralized implementation of the US Bankruptcy Code 
allows for experimentation and learning. The persistence of “local legal culture” is one 
example.’). That said, given filing patterns, it is reasonable to assume that practice in the 
east coast magnet courts – the Southern District of New York and the District of 
Delaware – is fairly representative: see n 184 below. 
167 To my knowledge no US Court of Appeals has ever endorsed the theory that a foreign 
entity’s case where eligibility is based on a peppercorn of property has global reach.  
168 The petition is itself an ‘order for relief’: 11 USC §301(b). 
169 See TMT Procurement Corporation v Vantage Drilling Company 764 F3d 512 (5th Cir 
2014) 516. Another procedural safeguard US courts can deploy where there are concerns 
about abuse is the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee: see eg In re China Fishery Group 
Limited (Cayman), Case No 16-11895 (JLG) (United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern 
District New York, 28 Oct 2016). 
170 Westbrook (n 43) 791. 
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UK at the outset.171 Clearly courts face challenges in SNMP cases where it is not 
immediately clear whether the debtor will also file concurrently in its home jurisdiction. 
But any notion that US courts with long experience in cross-border coordination172 will 
ignore what might be happening elsewhere and move full speed ahead is fanciful. The 
formal account of US bankruptcy law obscures how judges actually conduct business and 
assert judicial control. Through managerial styles of judging,173 including the use of 
information gathering devices such as status conferences, judges can and do put the 
brakes on US cases. A recent case in point is In re Legend International Holdings Inc, in 
which a chapter 11 case filed by a Delaware entity that had mining interests in Australia 
was put on hold to await the decision of an Australian court on a conjoined winding-up 
petition and application for recognition of the chapter 11.174  
The third reason relates to the universalists’ hope, to which I alluded at the end of 
Part II, that, under conditions of modified universalism, courts will increasingly tend to 
exercise domestic bankruptcy jurisdiction over foreign entities commensurate with the 
UNCITRAL Model Law’s rules for recognition of foreign main and non-main 
proceedings. In this respect, Northshore is instructive and provides a synthesis and 
snapshot of current US thinking. On the one hand, it reflects the US culture of liberal 
access and bullishness about the utility of chapter 11 – there is no finding that the 
developer acted in bad faith. On the other hand, it concedes that the case was back to 
front and allocates governance authority to the Bahamian court in the spirit of 
universalism. The outcome is significant because it sends the message that chapter 11 
cases – even those filed apparently in good faith – will be handled with proper regard for 
the jurisdiction of the COMI court. 175 The Legend International Holdings case, referred 
to in the previous paragraph, is in the same vein. The question, essentially, is one of 
coordination and US experience with chapter 15 provides a context for courts to await, 
and synchronize case management with, developments elsewhere. Were Congress to 																																																								
171 In re Cenargo International Plc (2003) 294 BR 571. 
172 The Maxwell, Lehman and Nortel cases all involved US courts in extensive cross-
border coordination of concurrent proceedings with foreign courts: see eg Peacock (n 22) 
on coordination in Nortel. On the practice of courts staying proceedings pending 
determinations in foreign courts as a coordinating device see JL Westbrook, 
‘International Judicial Negotiation’ (2003) 38 Tex Int’l LJ 567. 
173 See, albeit in different contexts, MB Jacoby, ‘What Should Judges Do in Chapter 11?’ 
[2015] U Ill LR 571; ‘Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy’ (2016) 
33 Yale J Reg 55. 
174 [2016] VSC 308 [45]-[48] (Supreme Court of Victoria, Trial Division), affd sub nom 
Legend Holdings Inc (in liquidation) v Indian Farmers Fertiliser Cooperative Ltd et al 
[2016] VSCA 151 [33]-[34] (Supreme Court of Victoria, Court of Appeal). The Delaware 
court later dismissed the chapter 11 case on the motion of the Australian liquidators 
supported by the US trustee’s office. The case exemplifies what Westbrook (n 172) 
describes as ‘international judicial negotiation’ because the US case did not move 
forward independently of the parallel proceeding in the Australian court. 
175 See further Shuster & Loveland (n 66) citing also to In re Compañia de Alimentos 
Fargo, SA (2007) 376 BR 427 as evidence of universalist tendencies in the chapter 15 
era. 
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enact the NBC amendment the trend would accelerate. Federal courts are well versed in 
doctrines of restraint such as forum non conveniens176 and, insofar as the US sticks with 
the Model Law, these doctrines, applied through the portal of section 305, are likely to 
lean towards universalism. 
For these reasons, we can plausibly conclude that the US approach to regulating 
bankruptcy forum shopping is approaching functional equivalence with the UK’s. 
Although a jurisdictional test with a forum non conveniens component is not applied on 
Day One, there are patent and latent mechanisms within the US system that serve similar 
ends. Although, the US approach to constraining abusive forum shopping is 
unsurprisingly on a different legal cultural path, rampant forum shopping can be checked 
despite the low eligibility bar. Furthermore, there are signs that the anti-abuse feedback 
loop generated by a mixture of constraints (broad standards in sections 305 and 1112(b) 
allied to procedural mechanisms) is further amplified by the US’s generally favourable 
reception of the UNCITRAL Model Law via chapter 15.  
 
VI. LEGAL DEVELOPMENT & FORUM SHOPPING 
 
Universalists have grounds to be optimistic about the trajectory of US law and practice in 
the last decade. But a fully symmetrical system in which domestic rules of bankruptcy 
jurisdiction mirror the Model Law’s recognition rules will not be inaugurated by 
modified universalism. Hegemons like the US will prefer to retain flexible access rules so 
as to preserve their strong position in the market for cases while reserving the capacity to 
push their regulatory apparatus outwards into transnational regulatory space or to deploy 
the vehicle of a full plenary bankruptcy as a coordinating mechanism. And while I have 
made a case for rough functional convergence, part of my argument is that law in action 
is not static. The US retains the capacity for unilateral assertion of bankruptcy jurisdiction 
even if, on my account, it currently favours jurisdictional congruence and international 
coordination.177 But even if we assume that modified universalism will persist as a 
framing principle for transnational insolvency cooperation and that, for the time being, 
cases like Northshore represent the direction of travel, global power and development 
imbalances will check the emergence of a symmetrical system.    
																																																								
176 CA Whytock & CB Robertson, ‘Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments’ (2011) 111 Colum LR 1444; WS Dodge, ‘International Comity in 
American Law’ (2015) 115 Colum LR 1, 15-16, 50-62; PK Bookman, ‘Litigation 
Isolationism’ (2015) 67 Stan LR 1081; Westbrook (n 172). 
177 Unilateralism will not be optimal insofar as multilateralism serves US interests: see 
further Raustiala (n 133). Moreover, the mismatch between rules of personal jurisdiction 
in the US and Europe, discussed in Michaels (n 159), will tend to reinforce jurisdictional 
congruence. If overseas courts are resistant to US notions of personal jurisdiction, the 
reach of the US case will be cabined. The UK Supreme Court’s decision in Rubin v 
Eurofinance SA [2013] 1 AC 236 is an exemplar. Nevertheless, history teaches us that the 
present, like the past, is contingent. 
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Legal development SNMPs, in particular, present universalists and sovereigntists 
with the problem that not all laws and legal systems are created equally.178 Avianca has 
been criticized as parochial because the subtext is that the US bankruptcy system is 
superior to the Colombian bankruptcy system.179 But Avianca and Northshore suggest 
that US courts will not lightly succumb to ‘better law’ arguments. If the US court can act 
effectively, and with restraint, to facilitate feasible reorganizations, cases may stick. If 
not, cases are unlikely to stick. Some may worry that Avianca180 creates a precedent for 
hegemons to suck in cases from emerging markets and so stifle the development of local 
legal systems. And yet, US courts routinely defer to bankruptcy proceedings in emerging 
countries, not least in South America.181 So American ‘better law’ parochialism is hardly 
pandemic. Good outcomes in SNMPs that could not be achieved so easily – or at all – in 
the debtor’s home country should not lightly be traded off where the result (for example, 
the potential collapse of a significant enterprise like Avianca) would harm the local 
economy. This is a fortiori where good outcomes are achieved in a jurisdictionally 
congruent manner.   
What makes legal development SNMPs tricky is a coordination problem − the 
lack of any ‘home’ case to which the SNMP court can defer. Shooing away debtors by 
applying universalist principle is not attractive to pragmatic courts if the prospects of 
successful resolution in the home country are uncertain at best, nonexistent at worse. 
Conversely, legal development SNMPs are precisely the kind of cases that are prone to 
asymmetric overreaching. The case of Arcapita, a Bahraini investment bank with offices 
in ‘Atlanta, London, Hong Kong and Singapore in addition to its Bahrain headquarters’182 
is illustrative.  																																																								
178 The problem afflicts private international law generally: see FK Juenger, ‘The 
Problem with Private International Law’ in J Basedow et al (eds), Private International 
Law in the International Arena (TMC Asser Press 2000). 
179 Westbrook (n 43) 786, 788. 
180 And Arcapita, a paradigmatic legal development case, discussed below.  
181 Shortly after presiding over Avianca, Judge Gropper dismissed a chapter 11 case in 
deference to an Argentinian proceeding: see In re Board of Directors of Multicanal S.A. 
(2004) 314 BR 486. In Avianca, he refused to resolve Colombian labour claims, deferring 
to the Colombian court’s adjudication of Colombian law even though the Colombian 
claimants were keen for him to intervene: In re Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia S.A. 
Avianca (2006) 345 BR 120. Subsequently, bankruptcy courts have recognized and given 
effect to Brazilian bankruptcy proceedings in the US on several occasions: In re Rede 
Energia S.A. (2014) 515 BR 69; In re OAS S.A. (2015) 533 BR 83; In re Petroforte 
Brasileiro de Petroleo Ltda (2015) 542 BR 899.  
182 In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(c) et al., Chapter 11 Case No. 12-11076 (United States 
Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York), 
Declaration of Henry A Thompson in Support of the Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petitions and 
First Day Motions and in Accordance with Local Rule 1007-2, 19 March 2012, available 
at <http://cases.gcginc.com/arcapita/pdflib/6_11076.pdf> (‘Thompson Declaration’). I 
gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Tally M Wiener in setting me straight on the 
facts of the case and for directing my attention to primary source materials on the 
Arcapita case docket.  
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Arcapita and certain affiliates, including a Cayman subsidiary, filed US chapter 
11 cases in New York. The cases were unopposed by the Central Bank of Bahrain and 
supported by a majority of Arcapita’s institutional lenders. Arcapita’s stated aim was to 
restructure a US $1.1 billion unsecured murabaha facility guaranteed by the Cayman 
subsidiary.183  Practitioners who worked on the creditor side of the case have suggested 
that it was placed in the US184 because Bahraini law was not up to the task. 185  For 
example, without a worldwide automatic stay, Bahrain law could not stop winding-up 
proceedings allegedly threatened against an Arcapita subsidiary in the Cayman Islands.186 
The debtors successfully confirmed a liquidating plan of reorganization.187	This success 
makes the Arcapita bankruptcy a shop window for the US to attract cases from debtors 
																																																								
183 Thompson Declaration (n 182) 6. 
184 Why New York rather than Atlanta, given that Arcapita’s principal place of business 
in the US is in Atlanta is not immediately clear: 28 USC 1410(1). This opens up a 
nuanced question that space does not permit me to address in detail. The question is how 
far do venue choice and forum shopping dynamics within the US affect placement of, and 
practice in, chapter 11 cases filed by foreign entities? There is an extensive literature on 
internal forum shopping in the domestic US market, a good deal of it responding to Lynn 
Lopucki’s ‘race to the bottom’ thesis set forth in Courting Failure: How the Competition 
for Big Cases is Corrupting the Bankruptcy Courts (Michigan University Press 2005). 
See further MB Jacoby, ‘Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-Controlled: Is Corporate 
Reorganization Failing?’ (2006) 54 Buffalo LR 401.  Of 316 cases in the Couwenberg & 
Lubben (n 7) dataset, 295 were filed in the Southern District of New York or the District 
of Delaware. As regards foreign entity chapter 11 cases, it is therefore reasonable to treat 
practice in these east coast magnet courts as a decent proxy for case management in the 
US bankruptcy system as a whole. 
185 JHM Sprayregen et al, ‘Arcapita and the Need for Mideast Restructuring Regimes’ 
INSOL World – Fourth Quarter (December 2015) 18. 
186 That subsidiary, Arcapita Investment Holdings Limited (AIHL) became one of the 
Arcapita Chapter 11 debtors.  Subsequent to becoming a Chapter 11 Debtor, AIHL issued 
a summons seeking ancillary relief from the Grand Court of the Cayman Island.  
Thompson Declaration (n 182) 1-2, 9. 
187 In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(c) et al., Chapter 11 Case No 12-11076, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order Confirming Second Amended Joint Plan of 
Reorganization of Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(c) and Related Debtors with Respect to Each 
Debtor Other than Falcon Gas Storage Company, Inc., Under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 17 June 2013 available at 
<http://cases.gcginc.com/arcapita/pdflib/1262_11076.pdf> 12.	The plan was a liquidating 
plan because it contemplated the orderly wind-down of the debtors’ investment portfolio 
on the basis that this would offer the best recovery for creditors. See further In re 
Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(c) et al., Chapter 11 Case No. 12-11076, Second Amended 
Disclosure Statement in Support of the Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of 
Arcapita Bank B.S.C.(c) and Related Debtors Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
25 April 2013, available at <http://cases.gcginc.com/arcapita/pdflib/1038_11076.pdf> 4.  
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who are financed on the basis of being Shari’ah compliant and who wish to restructure by 
utilizing pre-bankruptcy Shari’ah structures.188  
The significant point is that the Arcapita plan impairs some stakeholders and 
leaves others ‘out of the money.’ Most stakeholders are in the Middle East outside of US 
jurisdiction. They may well have received little or nothing in a formal insolvency 
proceeding regardless of where the case was placed. But this kind of SNMP case 
demands a high degree of cultural sensitivity having regard to the obvious language and 
culture gaps.189 By English standards, the filing is defensible as a legitimate ‘shop’ 
because ‘what is being attempted is [designed] to achieve a position where resort can be 
had to the law of a particular jurisdiction, not in order to evade debts but rather with a 
view to achieving the best outcome for creditors.’190 It may hasten insolvency law 
reforms in the Middle East.191 What I say here is in no way intended to criticize the 
bankruptcy court’s handling of the Arcapita case. But in this kind of complex, ambitious, 
transcultural bankruptcy case in which Western restructuring intersects with Islamic 
finance, the US courts would be wise, for due process and legitimacy reasons, to proceed 
carefully.  
The case involves an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction and the imposition of 
a US discharge on remote claimants. It is not clear how far the Bahrain courts would give 
effect to that discharge or, to what extent, remote claimants could successfully prosecute 
their claims against Arcapita’s successor entity in Bahrain or elsewhere.192 Creditor-
backed forum shops like Arcapita raise obvious inter-stakeholder agency problems. 
Diffuse remote creditors and investors cannot effectively coordinate and so are at the 
mercy of coordinated senior creditors as regards the governance of the case. Such cases 
therefore demand robust, transparent procedural protections for junior creditors that 
courts may find difficult to craft and manage. If we accept at face value the claim that the 
home country as yet lacks the legal tools and institutional culture to handle a legal 
development case, the alternative to a ‘shopped’ chapter 11 is to leave the debtor to 
flounder. Although a more extreme case than Avianca, Arcapita produces the same 
conundrum. In a world of power imbalances, should we allow the COMI principle to 
serve as a vehicle for local reform in emerging countries at the risk of causing economic 
harm pro tem in individual cases? Or should pragmatism – driven in large part by lenders 																																																								
188 As some of the practitioners involved in the case have been quick to advertise: see 
Sprayregen et al (n 185) 
189	Due to the prevalence of Arab stakeholders, the Notice of Confirmation Order was 
provided in both English and Arabic. 
190 Re Codere Finance (UK) Ltd [2015] EWHC 3778 (Ch) [18] (Newey J). See also 
Payne (n 41). 
191 Sprayregen et al (n 185). 
192 The Reorganized Debtors in the chapter 11 case are simply ‘run off’ vehicles. The 
latest unaudited financial statements for the Cayman parent of the Reorganized Debtor’s 
group indicate that claims have been made against the group in Bahrain although no 
provision has been made in the accounts: see 
<http://cases.gcginc.com/arcapita/pdflib/RA%20Holding%20FS%20mar%202016.pdf>. 
Meanwhile, a ‘new’ Arcapita, entirely distinct from the Reorganized Debtors has begun 
trading: <http://www.arcapita.com/>.  
	 39	
and case placers – prevail? My preference is for the latter but within proper boundaries, 
controlled by norms, including judicial congruence, feasibility, and due process. 
Reasonable minds may differ. To work well, my preference demands pro-active, hands 
on, managerial judging in real time.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
No system – certainly not one that wants to attract cases – will be a perfect ‘goldilocks’ 
system in which the balance between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forum shopping is ‘just right’. 
Legal frameworks are inevitably subject to under-inclusivity or over-inclusivity 
problems, although robust and experienced judges armed with broad standards do a good 
job most of the time.193 There will always be troublesome cases, which push the 
boundaries of jurisdictional congruence into the transnational ‘gap’ between domestic 
systems of regulation. Shipping cases, many of which are filed in the US,194 are a good 
example. The assets are mobile, the debtor’s COMI often malleable. As that now 
notorious SNMP case, Cambridge Gas 195  illustrates, outward projections of power 
require a favourable reception elsewhere for certain kinds of creative placement to work.  
To be sure, the US could take formal steps to differentiate domestic and foreign 
entity bankruptcies, push the logic of chapter 15 further, and limit the scope of the 
automatic stay in foreign entity cases to US territory.196 But, as I have sought to 
demonstrate, there are already functional constraints on US bankruptcy jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, the trend of federal jurisprudence in the wider context of transnational 
litigation is towards restraint.197 Transnational bankruptcy resolution involves real time 
coordination under conditions of interdependency. Effective jurisdiction is congruent 
jurisdiction or jurisdiction that will be accepted and enforced by other countries. US 																																																								
193 I do not entirely discount the concern that competition for cases among courts could 
facilitate ‘race to the bottom’ forum shopping but I am not as pessimistic as some about 
the capacity of US bankruptcy judges to regulate forum shopping intrusively and with 
proper regard for the jurisdiction of foreign courts. That said, effective regulation requires 
judges to switch from the transactional ‘hands off’ approach often observed in connection 
with domestic chapter 11 cases to a more managerial style of judging. On ‘transactional’ 
versus ‘managerial’ approaches in the US context, see further Jacoby (n 173) and Jacoby 
(n 184), 422-433. 
194 Couwenberg & Lubben (n 7). 
195 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corp v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of 
Navigator Holdings plc [2007] 1 AC 508. On the subsequent negative treatment of 
Cambridge Gas see Walters (n 1). 
196 Westbrook (n 43) argues for an immediate hearing at which the reach of the automatic 
stay could be adjusted. There is no doubt – and I have not sought to argue otherwise – 
that the automatic stay can cause much inconvenience where a pre-emptive filing is made 
in the US. Conversely, a globally effective stay that will be respected is incredibly useful 
in cases, such as shipping cases, where creditors can target mobile assets anywhere in the 
world: see E Flaschen et al ‘The Realities and Myths of Chapter 11’, Lloyd’s List, 4 
January 2012.  
197Above nn 75 and 79. 
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bankruptcy courts, and their international clientele, it seems, are as well attuned as UK 
courts to these feasibility considerations. This is not to discount the temptation for a 
hegemon to overreach. American faith in the global utility of American solutions – 
especially in the legal development context – is undoubtedly strong. Even so, it is 
important to distinguish the run-of-the-mill cases from the outliers. And, for now, it can 
be argued that the US’s functional bankruptcy jurisdiction in respect of foreign entities is 
not quite as long-arm as the formal law would suggest. 
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